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FEDERAL PRODUCT LEGISLATION AND TOXIC TORTS:
THE DEFENSE PERSPECTIVE
JOHN J. KIRCHERt
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the country has witnessed a dramatic increase in
both the number of product liability claims and in the litigation re-
sulting from these claims.I Governing the resolution of these claims is
a collection of legal principles known as product liability law. As it
exists today, product liability law is nothing more than the by-prod-
uct of changing concepts regarding the responsibility of those in-
volved in the business of manufacturing and selling products.2 Each
t Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School; former Research Direc-
tor (1972-80) of the Defense Research Institute. The author wishes to acknowledge
the substantial research contribution to this article of Cynthia M. Obremski, Mar-
quette University Law School, Class of 1983.
1. Although the lack of reliable data collection at the trial court level makes
estimates in this area somewhat suspect, one source has estimated that between 1971
and 1976 the number of product liability suits increased substantially, with between
60,000 and 70,000 claims filed in 1976. See Note, Industry- Wide Lzabity, 13 SUFFOLK
U.L. REV. 980, 984 n.24 (1979) (citing 5 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS
LIABILITY 585 App. 627 App. (1978)).
Several reasons may be advanced for this phenomenal growth in product liabil-
ity claims:
1. Improved technology has resulted in the development and production
of many new products and more complicated products to which the
American public is exposed.
2. Through the media and otherwise, the American public is now much
more aware of the right to seek a legal remedy for harm resulting from
the tortious conduct of another.
3. The organized plaintiffs' bar has enjoyed what only may be referred to
as a remarkable success in both the education of its membership (as to
new substantive theories and as to effective, new trial tactics), and in
advocacy in our courts and legislatures for pro-plaintiff law revision.
4. Our courts and legislative bodies, on the whole, have developed a con-
sumer-protective orientation which has found expression in the liberali-
zation of rules and legal liability.
2. For example, in 1965 the American Law Institute promulgated a rule of strict
tort liability for product sellers and claimed the following justification for the rule:
[T]he seller, by marketing his product for use and consumption, has under-
taken and assumed a special responsibility toward any member of the con-
suming public who may be injured by it; that the public has the right to
and does expect, in the case of products which it needs and for which it is
forced to rely upon the seller, that reputable sellers will stand behind their
goods; that public policy demands that the burden of accidental injuries
caused by products intended for consumption be placed upon those who
market them, and be treated as a cost of production against which liability
insurance can be obtained; and that the consumer of such products is enti-
(1116)
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jurisdiction has evolved its product liability laws to meet its own par-
ticular social and economic needs. Of course, these needs may differ
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Since the courts and legislature of
each state are in the best position to understand those needs, they are,
through the process of trial and error, continuously evolving a body of
law which not only has the flexibility necessary to meet changes but
also provides the stability of precedent.
Some members of Congress, however, have tended to view differ-
ently this evolution of product liability law. They have expressed the
belief that conflicting rules make it difficult for manufacturers and
other product sellers to know their legal obligations, and believe that
these rules create burdensome costs which are passed along to product
consumers. 3 These members of Congress believe that this diffused
process results in a burden to interstate commerce and that, as a re-
sult, federal product liability legislation is needed to establish uniform
standards and clear and reasonable guidelines for product liability.4
In the past few years, several bills have been proposed in Con-
gress that would preempt state product liability law and substitute in
its place a federal product liability statute. The most recent bill of
this type is S. 44, known as the "Product Liability Act," introduced
by Senator Kasten in the Ninety-eighth Congress. 5 This bill is a
slightly revised version of S. 2631, which was introduced by Senator
Kasten in the previous session of Congress. 6 Although S. 44 purports
to establish "uniform standards" and "clear and reasonable guide-
lines," it is submitted that Senate Bill 44, like its predecessor, does
neither. Rather than providing guidelines, it strips away existing
guidelines found in product liability law, and presents the potential
for an entirely new field of litigation. Furthermore, rather than estab-
lishing uniform standards, the bill employs generalized, undefined
tied to the maximum of protection at the hands of someone, and the proper
persons to afford it are those who market the products.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment c (1965).
3. SENATE COMM. ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE AND TRANSPORTATION, REPORT
ON PRODUCT LIABILITY ACT, S. REP. No. 670, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1982) [herein-
after cited as SENATE REPORT].
4. Id.
5. S. 44, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983). S. 44 was introduced into the Ninety-
eighth Congress on January 26, 1983. Hearings on the bill began on April 6, 1983.
98th Cong. 1983-84 CONG. INDEX (CCH) 21,002.
6. S. 2631, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982). Senate bill 2631, also known as the
"Product Liability Act," was favorably reported by the Senate Committee on Com-
merce, Science, and Transportation who recommended passage of the bill. SENATE
REPORT, supra note 3, at 1. S. 44 incorporates some of the changes which the Senate
Committee made in S. 2631. See, e.g., notes 21-23, 45-48 & 117 and accompanying
text infra. Otherwise, the two bills are virtually identical. Compare S. 44, supra note 5
with S. 263 1, supra.
1982-83] 1117
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terms the interpretation of which is left to state courts who would be
without the benefit of developed precedent.7
Far from alleviating uncertainty and instability in the law of
product liability, the proposed federal law would introduce more un-
certainty and instability into that area. It affords no more guidance
to those who are involved in interstate product activity than that
which currently exists, since each state would be compelled to formu-
late its own interpretations of this "uniform" legislation. Unquestion-
ably, those formulations would be based upon the public policy and
economics of each particular state. Thus, there would be no change
in the process by which product liability law is formulated, except
possibly in those instances where the Act preempts existing state
product liability law.8 Nevertheless, even in situations where the Act
has preempted existing law, state courts would necessarily be drawn
into the process of examining their own precedents to determine
whether they comport with, or are at variance with, the vague provi-
sions of the Act.
The problems which would result from the implementation of
the proposed Product Liability Act can best be illustrated by focusing
on the claims which center around the so-called "toxic torts," espe-
cially those claims which allege harm attributable to Diethylstilbes-
trol (DES) or asbestos. The advent of these claims has resulted in a
wealth of unique and complex issues which do not fit neatly into any
recognized theories applicable to product liability, litigation. State
courts have attempted to formulate product liability law to promote
state policies which include risk spreading, deterrence, and protection
of manufacturers. These state court decisions have also provided a
measure of guidance to the manufacturers and insurers of those prod-
ucts which "have contacts" with those states. The proposed federal
legislation purports to strip away that guidance and replace it with
ambiguity and vagueness. Although the case law which has devel-
oped in this area is far from perfect, and is certainly subject to further
refinement, it represents a well-reasoned and well-meaning attempt
7. See S. 44, supra note 5.
8. Id. § 3. The preemption section of S. 44 remains unchanged from the earlier
version of the bill. See S. 2631, supra note 6, § 3(c). According to the Committee
report on S. 2631, the legislative intent is to allow state law governing matters not
dealt with by the act to remain in place. SENATE REPORT, supra note 3, at 22. Al-
though some commentators have called for preemption of only state law inconsistent
with the Act, the Committee has recommended that to avoid confusion all state law
covered by the Act be preempted. Id. The Committee report points out that while
tort law has traditionally been a matter of state law, Congress has at times enacted
statutes preempting state tort law. Id. at 23. For a discussion of § 3(c) of S. 44,
dealing with the preemption issue, see note 132 and accompanying text i7fra.
1118 [Vol. 28: p. It116
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by the courts to clarify the myriad of problems in the area. On the
other hand, the proposed federal legislation is anything but well-rea-
soned and it does not approach a workable solution for the defendant
facing the many problems involved in litigating toxic tort claims.
Furthermore, as Justice Frankfurter so aptly pointed out, "The intrin-
sic difficulties of language and the emergence, after enactment, of sit-
uations not anticipated by even the most gifted legislative
imagination reveal the doubts and ambiguities in statutes that so
often compel judicial construction."9
The remainder of this article examines the problems which cur-
rently plague toxic tort litigation and then discusses why the proposed
"Product Liability Act" fails to remedy some of the most basic
problems inherent in this type of litigation.
II. Toxic TORT LITIGATION: THE DEFENDANT'S BATTLE
The defendant-manufacturer in a toxic tort action and its liabil-
ity insurer face numerous knotty problems. This article will attempt
to demonstrate that the proposed federal product liability legislation
alleviates none of these problems but instead attempts to avoid them
either through the use of vague or all-encompassing language, or by
ignoring them altogether.
A. Causation
A fundamental principle which underlies product liability law,
and indeed all tort law, is that an actor cannot be held legally respon-
sible for harm sustained by another unless there is a causal relation-
ship between the tortious conduct of the actor and the harm sustained
by the claimant.' 0 In the area of product liability, this principle is
commonly stated in terms of some "defect" in the product for which
the seller is responsible, and which is the legal cause of the injury or
damage sustained by the plaintiff. Although the issue of causation is
present in all product liability cases, it becomes particularly complex
and confusing in relation to the toxic tort.
One area in which this causation problem can be illustrated in-
volves claims emanating from the exposure of individuals to asbestos
products. Although the media and various commentators have gen-
erally focused upon the dangers which are inherent in exposure to
"asbestos products," the use of the generic term alone is potentially
9. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Kepner, 314 U.S. 44, 59-60 (1941) (Frank-
furter, J., dissenting).
10. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 430 (1965).
1982-83] 1119
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misleading. The asbestos industry as a whole produces a wealth of
diverse products.1 ' The dangers posed by these products differ widely
depending upon their tendency to release harmful asbestos fibers.' 2
Some asbestos products present little or no health risks, or present
risks which can be easily tolerated without adverse effects at certain
levels.' 3 Therefore, mere proof of exposure to "asbestos," without
more, does not in itself establish the causal link necessary to tie that
exposure to the physical harm alleged by a claimant. Furthermore,
since some products with identical names have asbestos-free forms for
certain applications,' 4 the fact that a plaintiff has been exposed to a
given product likewise does not establish the requisite causal link.
Furthermore, the link is all the more difficult to forge in light of the
medical and other scientific evidence which indicates that several as-
bestos-related diseases may be caused by factors other than exposure
to asbestos fibers, and that these diseases are not uniquely caused by,
or specifically traceable to asbestos products.15
In contrast to products containing asbestos, all DES was chemi-
cally identical. While the causation controversy is therefore not as
intense with DES-related disease as it is with asbestos-related disease,
there is some dispute as to whether there is in fact a causal link be-
tween DES and the maladies experienced by the offspring of the wo-
men who ingested the drug. 16
11. Mansfield, Asbestos. The Cases and the Insurance Problem, 15 FORUM 860, 861
(1980). Approximately 3000 different products contain asbestos. Id. Because of its
heat-resistant properties and fibrous structure asbestos is widely used as fireproofing
and insulating material. Id.
12. See Comment, An Examination of Recurring Issues in Asbestos Litigatton, 46 ALB.
L. REV. 1307, 1327-28 (1982). See also Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493
F.2d 1076, 1083 (5th Cir. 1973); In re Asbestos & Asbestos Insulation Material Prods.
Liab. Litig., 431 F. Supp. 906, 908 (J.P.M.D.L. 1977).
13. Note, The Causation Problem in Asbestos Litigation: Is There an Alternative Theory
of Liability?, 15 IND. L. REV. 679, 698 (1982). For example, asbestos bonded to a
finished product presents almost no health risk, while spray asbestos is highly danger-
ous to health. Id. at 692.
For a discussion of the medical effects of asbestos exposure, see Selikoff, Bader,
Bader, Churg & Hammond, Asbestosis and Neoplasia, 42 AM. J. MED. 487 (1967); Se-
likoff, Churg & Hammond, The Occurrence of Asbestosis Among Insulation Workers, 132
ANN. NEW YORK ACAD. SCL 139 (1965).
14. Mansfield, supra note 11, at 867.
15. Note, supra note 13, at 694. Various diseases that can be caused by asbestos
exposure may also be caused by the inhalation of "fibrous dust and chemicals." Id.
Other asbestos-linked diseases may be caused by exposure to "chromates, nickel,
coke, coke oven emissions, cigarette smoke, uranium, and arsenic." Id. at 694 n.75
(citing speech by Peter Shea, Home Office Supervising Examiner for Liberty Mutual
Ins. Co., Boston, Ma. to the Assoc. of Ins. Atty's, Mar. 21, 1980).
16. Fischer, Products Liability-An Analysis of Market Share Liability, 34 VAND. L.
REV. 1623, 1624 (1981). This commentator has noted that an estimated one-half
million to three million women used DES while pregnant. Id. (citing Comment, DES
1120 [Vol. 28: p. 1116
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In light of this fundamental and crucial controversy over medi-
cal causation which permeates the toxic tort area, it would seem logi-
cal to expect that any "comprehensive," "uniform" federal legislation
would include some provisions which would alleviate such areas of
dispute, if not eliminate them entirely. However, the proposed
"Product Liability Act" provides only that the claimant must estab-
lish "by a preponderance of the evidence that the unreasonably dan-
gerous aspect of the product was aproximate cause of the harm" which
forms the basis of the claim. 17 Although this requirement attempts to
paraphrase established hornbook law, its use of the term "proximate
cause" creates the potential for serious problems because the Act does
not define the term.18 Although "proximate cause" is a term widely
used by lawyers, it has acquired various meanings and, having no
integrated meaning of its own, its chameleon quality obscures the real
issues of a case. 19 The use in the proposed law of this vague and often
disputed standard provides the courts with no guidance and will com-
pel state courts to rely on precedent to interpret the phrase; or, if such
precedent is to be ignored, it will require them to "re-invent the
wheel." If state courts are to employ old precedent, or create new
precedent, then little if anything will be gained by the "new" federal
standard.
Through the use. of the "proximate cause" standard, Congress
would also necessarily invite any litigation to become a battle of ex-
perts, a situation not unlike the present state of affairs. Toxic tort
and a Proposed Theoty of Enterprise Liability, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 963 (1978)). How-
ever, only 384 women born during the period when DES was prescribed also suffer
from the rare form of cancer DES allegedly causes. Id. at 1624 (citing Herbst, Cole,
Norusis, Welch & Scully, Epidemologic Aspects and Factors Related to Survival in 384 Regis-
tOy Cases of Clear Cell Adenocarcinoma of the Vagina and Cervix, 135 AM. J. OBSTET.
GYNECOL. 876, 877 (1979)). Furthermore, only 213 of this group had mothers who
took DES while pregnant. Even among these 213 women, there was no clear causal
connection between DES and the disease. Id. at 1624 (citing Note, Beyond Enterprise
Liability in DES Cases--Sindell, 14 IND. L. REv. 695, 713-14 (1981)).
17. S. 44, ,98th Cong., supra note 5, § 4(a)(2), at 7 (emphasis added).
18. See generally S. 44, supra note 5. Although S. 44 does have a definition sec-
tion, "proximate cause" is not defined. The Senate Committee report on S. 2631,
which contained the same proximate cause language as the current version of the bill,
likewise contained no real guidance as to the meaning of the term "proximate cause."
It merely stated that "proximate cause" generally means that which is a significant
cause in fact and is a factual inquiry inherent in each case. SENATE REPORT, supra
note 3, at 24 & n.67.
19. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 42, at 244-50 (4th
ed. 1971). Prosser notes that the confusion involved in defining proximate cause had
led to different formulae. Id. at 246. These proposed formulae include the following:
the nearest cause; the last human wrongdoer, cause and condition; the substantial
factor test; and the justly attachable cause test. Id. at 246-48. See also Green, Proxi-
mate Cause in Texas Neghgence Law, 28 TEX. L. REv. 471 (1950).
1982-83] 1121
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litigation is an area flooded with differing test results regarding the
incidence of disease resulting from exposure to toxic substances. This
conflict among experts is often seen in toxic tort litigation when ex-
perts who evaluate identical information come to different conclu-
sions.20 By utilizing only the "proximate cause" standard, the
proposed federal legislation has done little to prevent this conflict
among experts from becoming a central problem in product liability
litigation.
An earlier version of the bill introduced into the Senate in June,
1982, provided that expert opinion was insufficient to support a fac-
tual proposition unless it was supported or corroborated by objective
evidence.2' However, the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science,
and Transportation deleted this provision from the bill, contending
that sufficient safeguards exist with regard to such testimony to justify
its admission without corroboration. 22 Although the inclusion of this
provision regarding expert testimony may not have been well-ad-
vised, its deletion in S. 4423 and the deference given to the trial judge
in evaluating an expert's qualifications, coupled with his freedom to
instruct the jury regarding such testimony,24 serves to illustrate the
unsatisfactory, incomplete character of the proposed legislation. In
refusing to address the usage and propriety of expert testimony in
these actions, the bill opens the door to more confusion and uncer-
20. See In Re Asbestos & Asbestos Insulation Material Prods. Liab. Litig., 431 F.
Supp. 906, 909 (J.P.M.D.L. 1977) ("[t]he question of whether particular disorders
may be attributable to exposure to a particular type of asbestos is a matter of dispute
among medical authorities"). As one commentator has noted, in asbestos litigation
these differences of expert opinion are often "major, fundamental, tenaciously held,
and rigidly conceptualized." Peters & Peters, Asbestos Product Liabiity, 4 J. PROD.
LIAB. 49, 53 (1981).
21. S. 2631, supra note 6, § 4(b), at 7. Section 4(b) of S. 2631 reads as follows:
"The claimant must introduce sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable person, by a
preponderance of the evidence, to make the determinations specified in subsection
(a). Expert opinion is not considered sufficient evidence to support a proposition of
fact unless it is supported or corroborated by sound objective evidence." Id.
S. 44, the current version of the "Product Liability Act," deletes the second sen-
tence of this section in accord with the recommendations of the Senate Committee
Report for S. 2631.
22. SENATE REPORT, supra note 3, at 14.
23. S. 44 only requires that "[t]he claimant must introduce sufficient evidence to
allow a reasonable person, by a preponderance of the evidence, to make the determi-
nations specified in subsection (a)." S. 44, supra note 5, § 4(b), at 7.
24. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 3, at 14. In evaluating the expert testimony
provision in S. 2631, the Committee stated that proponents of the expert testimony
provision had expressed a view that uncorroborated expert testimony should not be
sufficient to establish a product liability claim. Id. However, the Committee noted,
there was other testimony which concluded that sufficient safeguards already existed
with respect to expert testimony. Id. Therefore, the Committee concluded that addi-
tional study was necessary before instituting any legislative remedy in this area. Id.
1122 [Vol. 28: p. It116
HeinOnline  -- 28 Vill. L. Rev. 1122 1982-1983
FEDERAL PRODUCT LEGISLATION
tainty, and consequently more litigation-a far cry from its intended
goal.
B. Causation-Manufacturer Identificatzon
Assuming that a claimant can satisfactorily establish a causal
link between the harm alleged and some generic substance, a question
inevitably remains concerning the identity of the manufacturer of the
particular product responsible for the harm. While this question
presents no problem at all in most types of product liability actions, it
is a particularly difficult problem in toxic tort litigation. Although
"DES" or "asbestos" may be the culprit, both substances are, or have
been, manufactured by numerous companies of varying size and in
different geographic locations. 25 The identification problem is fur-
ther clouded by the lengthy latency period of diseases allegedly
caused by DES and asbestos. 26 In the decades between exposure to
the questioned substance and the onset of any disease, the claimant's
memory regarding the brand of the product involved is likely to have
grown dim and any manufacturing records which may have existed
that could shed light on the question have probably been lost or
destroyed. 27
This problem is severe in DES cases, because a claimant's mother
is often unable to recall the brand of the drug she ingested perhaps
fifteen or twenty years ago. 28 It is even more complex in cases involv-
ing asbestos exposure, where a claimant may have worked on many
different job sites at which his employer or other contractors utilized
asbestos products obtained from a number of different suppliers and
manufacturers. 29 When a claimant was exposed to asbestos as a by-
25. Comment, Overcomng the Identfication Burden in DES Litigation: The Market
Share Liability Theoy, 65 MARQ. L. REV. 609, 615 (1982).
For example, in asbestos litigation 80 defendants were named in 103 asbestos
suits. These defendants consisted of various manufacturers and sellers of asbestos
products. See In re Asbestos & Asbestos Insulation Prods. Liab. Litig., 431 F. Supp.
906, 908 (J.P.M.D.L. 1977). Identifying the manufacturer of the DES that caused a
plaintiff's injury is an equally difficult task because DES was a fungible drug and
pharmacists filled prescriptions for it with whatever brand was available. See Com-
ment, supra, at 615 (citing Note, DES: Judicial Interest Balancing and Innovation, 22
B.C.L. REv. 747, 749 (1981)).
26. Comment, supra note 25, at 615. Cancer identified with DES has a latency
period of 10-20 years. Id. (citing Anderson, Watring, Edinger, Small, Netland &
Safaii, Development of DES-Associated Clear-Cell Carcinoma.: The Importance of Regular
Screening, 53 OBSTET. & GYNEC. 293, 297 (1970)). See also Note, supra note 1, at 999;
Note, supra note 13, at 681.
27. Comment, supra note 25, at 615. See also Note, supra note 1, at 999; Note,
supra note 13, at 681.
28. Note, supra note 25, at 615.
29. Note, supra note 13, at 681.
1982-83] 1123
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stander or as a consumer and the search cannot be confined to any
particular employer, the identification problem becomes
monumental. 30
In their desire to fashion a solution to the identification problem
facing toxic tort plaintiffs, courts have been rather creative in stretch-
ing the boundaries of tort law far beyond their intended or logical
limits. For example, the New York Court of Appeals in Bichler v. Eli
Lilly & Co. 31 determined that DES manufacturers were engaged in a
form of concerted action-labeled "conscious parallelism"-and im-
posed liability on that basis, even though the plaintiff could not iden-
tify the manufacturer of the drug that was ingested by her mother.32
Another novel approach for holding DES manufacturers liable de-
spite a plaintiffs inability to identify the manufacturer of the drug
her mother had taken was formulated in the landmark opinion of
Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, Inc. 33 In Sindell, the California Supreme
Court concluded that a claimant who sued a "substantial share" of
the relevant DES manufacturing "market" could maintain a cause of
action. 34 If the plaintiff prevailed, those manufacturers named in the
suit would be responsible for the percentage of the plaintiffs damages
which corresponded to their share of the DES market. 35 Courts faced
with claims against asbestos manufacturers have similarly assessed li-
ability without regard to proper identification of the manufacturers
of the allegedly harmful substances involved, and have apportioned
damages equally among the defendant/manufacturers despite the
disparity among those manufacturers in terms of their size and the
30. Id.
31. 55 N.Y.2d 571, 436 N.E.2d 182, 450 N.Y.S.2d 776 (1982).
32. Id. Bichler involved a DES daughter who contracted cervical and vaginal
cancer. Id. at 577, 436 N.E.2d at 184, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 778.
33. Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr.
132, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980). In Sihdell, the plaintiff and 100 other similarly
situated women brought suit against 11 drug companies who had produced DES. Id.
at 593, 607 P.2d at 925, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 133. The plaintiff alleged that ingestion of
the defendants' DES had caused cancerous vaginal or cervical growths in the daugh-
ters of mothers who had taken the drug while pregnant. Id. at 594-95, 607 P.2d at
926, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 133-34. However, the plaintiff was unable to prove which one
of the defendants had produced the actual DES taken by her mother. Id. at 598, 607
P.2d at 928, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 136.
34. Id. at 612-13, 607 P.2d at 937-38, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145-46.
35. Id., 607 P.2d at 937-38, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145-46. According to the Sthdell
court, all the defendants had manufactured an identical product and, through no
fault of the plaintiff, the manufacturer who caused the plaintiffs injury could not be
identified. Id. at 611, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144. In this situation, the
court said, it is fair to hold each manufacturer liable for the proportion of the judg-
ment represented by its share of the DES market. Id. at 611-12, 607 P.2d at 937, 163
Cal. Rptr. at 145.
1124 [Vol. 28: p. 1 116
HeinOnline  -- 28 Vill. L. Rev. 1124 1982-1983
FEDERAL PRODUCT LEGISLATION
types of products manufactured. 36
These "shot-gun approaches" are undoubtably premised on
speculation and are patently unfair. A cause of action which targets
only a "substantial share" of an undefined market, or which names
only those producers that can be remembered or that are amenable to
process, faces a very real possibility of excluding the one manufac-
turer whose product was responsible for the harm the claimant suf-
fered.37 A claimant afflicted with an illness allegedly caused by
exposure to asbestos may well attempt to sue all of the manufacturers
or other sellers whose products were present at any of the job sites
where that claimant worked. However, even in the unlikely event
that the claimant is successful in identifying and joining all of these
potential defendants, the proof regarding the amount of exposure to
each allegedly harmful product is clearly speculative, because of the
variable working conditions and the presence or absence of safety pre-
cautions. 38 Given the time lag between exposure and illness and the
numerous, often intangible, factors which differentiate the potential
defendants in such actions, liability will inevitably be placed upon
blameless sellers while the real culprit may go free. Proponents of
these new approaches contend that these inequities will resolve them-
selves in the long run and that all manufacturers and other sellers will
eventually come to bear their proper measure of liability.39 This ar-
36. See Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974). Borel was an industrial insulation worker who sued
several manufacturers of asbestos-containing insulation. Id. at 1081. He alleged that
the manufacturers had breached a duty of care by failing to warn of the dangers in
handling asbestos products. Id. After determining that the jury had sufficient evi-
dence to conclude that each defendant's conduct was a substantial factor in the
plaintiff's injury, the court addressed itself to the apportionment of damages. Id. at
1094. Applying Texas law, the Fifth Circuit held that where several causes combine
to produce an injury that reasonably cannot be divided, then the tortfeasors may be
held jointly and severally liable. Id. at 1094-96.
37. Fischer, supra note 16, at 1659. According to this commentator, the market
share liability theory has its origin in alternative liability, a fault-based doctrine
which was designed to impose liability where the traditional rules of causation have
failed. Id. Under the market share theory of liability, however, there is no assurance
that the actual culprit is before the court. Id. See also Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 616, 607
P.2d at 939, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 147 (Richardson, J., dissenting).
38. Mansfield, supra note 12, at 875. In the typical asbestos-related disease suit,
the plaintiff is an insulation or shipyard worker who has been using products contain-
ing asbestos in his job for several decades. Id. The plaintiff usually will sue all of the
manufacturers whose asbestos products were present at the job sites during the time
when the plaintiff had worked. Id. As one commentator has pointed out, the exact
amount of dust created by each manufactuer's product or inhaled by the plaintiff can
only be purely speculative. Id.
39. Note, Beyond Enterprise Liability in DES Cases-Sindell, 14 IND. L. REv. 695,
718 (1981). Since the Sindell approach requires the defendants to possess a "substan-
tial" share of the entire market, only a minority of manufacturers would not have to
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gument, however, is based upon speculation, and certainly cannot
justify the initial imposition of such inequities.
The likelihood that a manufacturer ultimately will be held liable
only for harm caused by its own actions is further decreased because
these new theories of liability without caustion discourage open fact-
finding. For example, DES manufacturers marketed their product as
a generic drug and marketed it for several different uses. Conse-
quently, these manufacturers are often unable to collect data which
would exonerate them from liability in a particular case. 40 Unlike the
famous case of Summers v. Tice, 4 1 where the court fashioned a theory of
alternative liability in part because the defendant had access to the
evidence, the mothers who took DES who possess the crucial informa-
tion regarding the identity of the DES ingested. Far from encourag-
ing those individuals who took the drug to come forth with this
evidence, the current system of handling toxic tort claims instead en-
courages the suppression of that information. 42 It is much more ap-
pealing to collect from many manufacturers, rather than to be limited
to the one responsible manufacturer who may be judgment-proof.43
offset their liability costs with increased prices. Id. However, if these smaller manu-
facturers achieve greater financial success through an initial avoidance of liability,
they will become more attractive to plaintiffs and thus be more likely to be named as
defendants in subsequent suits. Id.
40. Fischer, supra note 16, at 1648. Sindell requires that each defendant be held
liable for that proportion of the judgment represented by its share of the DES sold
unless the defendant demonstrates it could not have made the DES which caused the
plaintiff's injuries. Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 612, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
Since some manufacturers may have inadequate records or no records at all, they will
be unable to meet the burden the Sihdell court has imposed upon them. See Fischer,
supra note 17, at 1649.
Even if a defendant might have made the DES which allegedly caused the plain-
tiff's injuries, the market share theory still produces inequitable results. For example,
because DES had a variety of uses, raw production figures may not accurately reflect
a manufactuer's share of the DES that was sold to prevent miscarriages. Id. at 1648.
Furthermore, the fact that over 200 companies produced DES makes it difficult to
gather the statistics necessary to compute accurately a defendant's true market share.
See id. See also Szhdell, 26 Cal. 3d at 602, 607 P.2d at 931, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 139.
41. 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948). In Summers, the plaintiff was shot by one of
two hunters who had each negligently fired his gun in the plaintiff's direction. Id. at
82, 199 P.2d at 2. Since the plaintiff had been acting in a reasonable way and both
defendants were culpable and in a better position to identify the actual tortfeasor the
court held that both defendants bore the burden of uncertainty as to which defend-
ant actually caused the injury. Id. at 88, 199 P.2d at 5.
42. Fischer, supra note 17, at 1650. If the plaintiff could establish the identity of
the responsible manufacturer but that manufacturer is insolvent, the plaintiff would
be in a worse position than a plaintiff who could not identify the manufacturer of the
DES that her mother had ingested. Id. The plaintiff who could not identify the
specific manufacturer would be able to recover damages from joined defendants
based on a market share theory while the plaintiff who could identify the manufac-
tuer would have no recovery. Id.
43. Id. at 1649-50. For a discussion of this problem, see note 41 supra. See also
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The same situation, of course, is true with regard to asbestos cases. 44
The eagerness of some of our courts to fashion these novel reme-
dies has forced manufacturers and their insurers to fight diligently
those measures, thus resulting in protracted and expensive litigation.
A defendant must be prepared to anticipate and counter any hybrid
theory which a court or opposing counsel may propose. This makes it
difficult to prepare an adequate defense, since traditional legal theo-
ries are likely to be ignored. 45 Furthermore, the manufacturer may
well be caught without adequate rejoinder to an approach proposed
by a claimant and accepted by the court.
In light of the precarious position of manufacturers in toxic tort
litigation, it would seem elementary that any proposed federal legisla-
tion would confront the causation-identification issue and resolve the
problem in a clear, equitable fashion. However, the proposed "Prod-
uct Liability Act" would only intensify and exacerbate the problems
which already exist. This confusion is clearly illustrated by compar-
ing two drafts of this supposedly comprehensive piece of legislation.
The earlier version of the bill, introduced in the Senate in June,
1982, as S. 2631, required a claimant to establish by a preponderance
of the evidence that "the individual product unit which allegedly
caused the harm complained of was manufactured by the defend-
Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 618, 607 P.2d at 941, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 149 (Richardson, J.,
dissenting).
As Justice Richardson pointed out in his Sindell dissent, in an ordinary tort case
the plaintiff must "take a chance that defendant can be reached and can respond
financially." Id. Under the market share theory, however, "those plaintiffs who
wholly fail to prove any causation. . .[are] rewarded by being offered both a wider
selection of potential defendants and a greater opportunity for recovery." Id.
44. Three asbestos companies-UNR Industries, the Manville Corporation, the
Amatex Corporation-have filed under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy code. See
Tarnoff, Asbestos Broker Says Suits Forcing It Out of Bustiness, Bus. Ins., Feb. 21, 1983, at
2, col. 2-3. In jurisdictions which have adopted a market share approach to liability,
a plaintiff who is unable to identify the manufacturer of the asbestos he used at his
job would nonetheless be able to recover damages. In contrast, a plaintiff who knew
he used asbestos produced by the Manville Corporation could not recover damages
because the bankruptcy petition would prevent a judgment from being entered
against the defendant.
45. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 3, at 7. In evaluating the litigation
problems in products liability cases the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science,
and Transportation has observed as follows:
Uncertainty about the law of product liability increases the costs of
litigating a claim. Time and effort must be expended by all parties to de-
termine what the applicable legal rules are. Further, the possibility that a
court may adopt a new legal standard in a given case gives the parties the
incentive to argue for adoption of a new standard which would aid their
case. Parties may have to brief and rebrief the same legal arguments re-
peatedly. Because the law is unclear and because, even if it is clear, may
change, parties have great difficulty evaluating the merits of their case.
Id. See also Note, supra note 37, at 707.
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ant."' 4 6 However, the bill then mitigated, if not abrogated entirely,
the effect of this identification requirement by providing that if such
identification was not feasible, the action could proceed if the claim-
ant proved by clear and convincing evidence that every reasonable
effort was made to identify the manufacturer, that the action had
been commenced against all manufacturers who could possibly be re-
sponsible, and that all of these manufacturers were in a better posi-
tion than the claimant to identify the responsible manufacturer.
47
The impracticality of this latter provision is readily apparent. It is
virtually impossible to join all possibly responsible manufacturers in
toxic tort actions since the crux of the identification problem is pre-
cisely that all such parties cannot possibly be identified, given the
number of manufacturers and the absence of data after a long latency
period. Furthermore, defendant/manufacturers can not be in a supe-
rior position to identify the responsible party or parties. In fact, the
widespread distribution of a manufacturers' products and the lack of
records of distribution patterns makes it impossible for a given manu-
facturer to exonerate itself, much less definitively inculpate another.
In light of the uselessness of the draft language, it would seem
logical that any revision of the bill would carefully formulate the per-
tinent provision in recognition of the importance of the manufacturer
identification issue. However, the revisions set forth by the Senate
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation in its report
issued in December, 1982, instead eliminated the identification re-
quirement of the legislation entirely, without giving any explanation
as to the rationale behind this omission. 48  In lieu of attempting to
formulate a workable approach to the problem, the Committee's ap-
proach was to "solve" the problem by ignoring it. Regrettably, S. 44,
the current version of the bill, adopts the Committee's approach.
49
46. S. 2631, supra note 6, § 4(a)(2), at 7. The requirement of specifically identi-
fying the defendant as the manufacturer of the individual product unit causing the
harm was dropped when the bill was reintroduced in the 98th Congress as S. 44. See
S. 44, supra note 5. Under S. 44, the sole requirement for assessing a manufacturer's
liability once its product has been proven unreasonably dangerous, is that the unrea-
sonably dangerous aspect of the product must have been the proximate cause of the
harm complained of by the plaintiff. See id. § 4(a)(2), at 7.
47. S. 2631, supra note 6, § 4(c), at 7-8. The new version of the bill has deleted
this section. See S. 44, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983). For a discussion of the determina-
tion of liability under S. 44, see note 44 supra.
48. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 3, at 24. Apparently, the committee de-
cided that the product liability claimant need not even attempt to identify a respon-
sible manufacturer, since such identification is no longer an element of the cause of
action. Nor does such a claimant have to explain why the identification is not feasi-
ble or demonstrate that a good faith attempt at identification was made.
49. See S. 44, supra note 5, § 4(a)(2), at 7. For a discussion of the treatment of
the identification issue in S. 44, see notes 44-45 and accompanying text supra.
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The avoidance of the crucial manufacturer identification issue,
of course, does not obliterate the problems created by that issue.
Such complex problems do not simply disappear when ignored. In-
stead, they will continue to plague toxic tort cases until solved in
some fashion by the courts. Since the proposed federal law provides
no guidance in this area, courts would be compelled to approach the
issue in the same haphazard and inequitable manner as has presently
been utilized. In addition, courts adopting the Sindell market share
approach to DES litigation would continue to be faced with certain
basic definitional deficiencies. Although the Sindell court required
that a "substantial share" of the DES market be joined as defendants,
it never explained what exactly constituted such a "substantial share"
and provided no guidance for those attempting to reach such a deter-
mination. 50 This determination of what constitutes a "substantial
share" of the market is obviously central to the entire market share
theory, since the asserted purpose of the theory would fail unless suffi-
cient manufacturers were joined to increase the likelihood that the
real offender is included, and to enable the manufacturers to use the
collective information provided by all defendants to possibly exoner-
ate themselves. 51 Yet, once again, the federal act evinces an igno-
rance of the critical problem in this area. While the case law is far
from perfect, it certainly affords more guidance than does the silent
legislation.
Similarly, the Szndell court required that the ambiguous "sub-
stantial share" be drawn from the relevant "market" but failed to
define the latter term. 52 Consequently, it is uncertain whether the
50. See Note, Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories: A Market Share Approach to DES
Causation, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 1179, 1197 (1981). According to this commentator, the
Sindell court may have declined to specify a fixed percentage that would constitute a
substantial share because it did not wish to be inflexible. Id. For a discussion of
Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, see notes 33-35 and accompanying text supra.
51. Note, supra note 48, at 1197. The commentator noted that the Sndell court
advanced two reasons for using a substantial joinder requirement. Id. These reasons
were the reduction of the likelihood that an offending manufacturer would escape
liability and the mitigation of the injustice of shifting the burden of proof to the
defendant. Id. (citing Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 612, 607 P.2d at 934, 163 Cal. Rptr. at
145). According to this commentator, the presence of the major producers of DES in
a suit will also presumably cause the market information necessary for defendants to
prove that they were less likely the cause of the plaintiffs injuries or perhaps not even
present in the relevant market to be available. Id. at 1197-98. See also Note, supra
note 38, at 720.
52. See Note, supra note 48, at 1189-92. Three market factors might be used in
determining relevant market share. Id. The first, which is the only factor mentioned
by the Sindell court, is that if the manufacturer can prove it did not sell DES during
the appropriate purchasing period it could be dismissed from the suit. Id. at 1189.
The geographic market could also be a factor, though there is nothing in Sndell
which specifically defines the relevant geographic market. Id. at 1190-91. Finally,
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determination of the relevant "market" should be applicable in all
cases. 53 Regardless of the approach taken, this appropriate market
would be extremely difficult to define, since relevant data is often un-
available.54 Although the determination of a relevant market is cru-
cial to the identification issue, the proposed federal bill again
completely ignores the problem.
Unfortunately, this avoidance of the identification issue in rela-
tion to market evaluation can only result in an inequitable assessment
of damages against blameless manufacturers. The Sindell case may
attempt to resolve this dilemma in DES cases by imposing liability on
the basis of market share. 55 However, since the claimant under Szndell
can recover herfu// damages even if a less than complete market is
joined as defendants, those manufacturers who are made parties to
the action will, in essence, be paying damages attributable to those
manufacturers not joined. 56 Despite this inequity, the approach nev-
ertheless represents an attempt toward solving the problem. Other
courts may find joint and several liability appropriate in DES cases
and still others may formulate a new approach. Judicial decisions,
therefore, represent a reasoned approach to the area of toxic torts in
spite of the drawbacks which may be inherent in a particular deci-
sion. The proposed federal act which is oblivious to these crucial
questions and which requires the creation of new judicial precedent is
wholly unnecessary.
The inadequacy of the federal act is apparent in other types of
toxic tort cases as well. In cases dealing with the liability of asbestos
manufacturers, some courts have found these manufacturers to be
jointly and severally liable 57 and have apportioned damage awards
where the physical characteristics of the DES pill taken by the plaintiff's mother can
be determined, this too should be a market factor. Id. at 1192.
53. Fischer, supra note 16, at 1643. If the case-by-case approach is adopted,
courts will determine the relevant market based on the evidence available in a given
case, which could lead to inconsistent results. Id.
54. See id. at 1648-49. There are several factors which make it difficult to define
the appropriate market in DES cases. First, since DES-related injuries have a long
latency period, records bearing on this issue may have been lost or destroyed. Id. at
1648. Secondly, there is no statistical breakdown between the amount of DES pre-
scribed to prevent miscarriages-and thus relevant to determining the appropriate
market share-and that supplied for other uses. Id. Finally, even where raw DES
production data is available, the different marketing strategies of manufacturers may
make it difficult to coordinate this data with the relevant market. Id. at 1649. See
also Comment, supra note 25, at 632.
55. See Szndell, 26 Cal. 3d at 613, 607 P.2d at 37-38, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145-46.
For a discussion of Szndell, see notes 32-34 and accompanying text supra.
56. See Fischer, supra note 16, at 1645-47..
57. See, e.g., Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974). In Borel, the court held jointly and severally
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equally among the defendant manufacturers despite deficiencies in
size and production volume. 58 In each instance, the courts have
sought to resolve the issue of proper apportionment of damages
among defendants. The proposed federal legislation would halt the
progress toward this goal without contributing anything toward a
reasoned solution.
Currently, manufacturers also face numerous jurisdictional
problems when they try to join other manufacturers who may be re-
sponsible for the harm claimed. 59 By placing jurisdiction over prod-
uct liability claims in state courts, the proposed federal act does not
alleviate this jurisdictional dilemma. 60
Clearly, the proposed federal legislation does little to assist a
manufacturer defendant in his case and does just as little to curtail
the arbitrary assessment of liability which so often occurs. If Congress
chooses not to solve this problem, the courts should be permitted to
continue developing more workable aproaches, without the shackles
of a useless federal regulatory scheme.
C. Economic Concerns
Arbitrary and encompassing liability, such as that which results
liable manufacturers who had failed to warn insulation workers of the lethal danger
of inhaling asbestos dust. Id. at 1095-96. The Borel court noted that
in the instant case, it is impossible, as a practical matter, to determine with
absolute certainty which particular exposure to asbestos dust resulted in
injury to Borel. It is undisputed, however, that Borel . . . was exposed to
the products of all the defendants on many occasions. . . . [Because] the
effect of exposure to asbestos dust is cumulative, . . . the jury could find
that each defendant was the cause in fact of some injury to Borel.
Id. at 1094. Since the tortious acts of the defendants combined to cause an indivisible
injury, the Borel court concluded that all should be held jointly and severally liable
for the entire damages. Id. at 1095.
58. Id. at 1102. However, as one commentator has noted, the practice of appor-
tioning damages equally among defendants without requiring the plaintiff to show
what portion of his injury is attributable to any single defendant produces an unfair
result. See Mehaffy,Asbestos-Related Lung Disease, 16 FORUM 341, 348 (1980). Distrib-
uting the burden equally presumes that all manufacturers are of approximately the
same size, yet a small manufactuer's products may have only been used by the plain-
tiff on rare occasions. Id. Therefore, it is manifestily unfair to hold the small manu-
facturer to the same degree of liability as a large manufacturer whose products the
plaintiff had been using extensively over a number of years. Id.
59. See Note, supra note 37, at 721-22. In Sindell, a California case, actions in-
volving the sale of drugs in Illinois and in Florida were consolidated. Id. at 721.
However, since some companies that sold DES in those states did not sell DES in
California, they may not have been subject to the jurisdiction of the California
courts. Id. at 721-22. Furthermore, due to the inevitable loss of records over the
years between exposure to DES and manifestation of a DES-related injury, it may
have been impossible to establish whether a defendant actually sold the drug in a
particular state. See Fischer, supra note 17, at 1649.
60. See S. 44, supra note 5, § 3(d) at 6.
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from the abrogation of strict causation and identification require-
ments, clearly poses severe and potentially debilitating economic
problems for manufacturers. The increasingly large judgments ob-
tained in DES cases have exposed manufacturers to crushing liability
for conduct which when originally undertaken posed no unreasonable
risk of harm to others.61 Similarly, the cost of damages in asbestos
cases may come to billions of dollars, and transcend the financial ca-
pacity of the industry, insurers, and government-funded programs. 62
In light of this potentially monumental liability, manufacturers
are compelled to insure themselves against possible financial ruin.
However, the unpredictability of potential loss in this area has in-
creased insurance rates substantially. 63 Many companies, particu-
larly smaller ones, may not be able to afford larger insurance
premiums; 64 yet without insurance they have little hope of obtaining
needed investment capital. 65 Furthermore, both smaller companies
and their larger counterparts may deem it financially unwise to pass
this burden of increased insurance costs on to the consuming public in
the form of higher product prices. Faced with excessive judgments
and increased business expenses associated with potential liability,
some businesses are faced with the prospect of bankruptcy or may
decide to go out of business.66
Small manufacturers, which have a lesser ability to distribute
such costs, are undoubtedly more prone to bankruptcy than are larger
enterprises. 67 However, larger manufacturers which are blameless
61. See generall Note, supra note 1, at 1013. See also Mehaffy, supra note 56 at
352. Of course, to the extent that the doctrine of strict liability in tort is applied in
those actions, the reasonableness of the manufacturer's conduct is of absolutely no
consequence. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment a (1965).
62. Peters & Peters, supra note 20, at 50.
63. Note, supra note 1, at 1003. The difficulty of estimating potential liability
provokes insurers to protect themselves by charging higher rates. Id.
64. Id. at 1003. Liability insurance costs have soared as much as 300% in one
year, mainly due to increases in the number and size of product liability claims. Id.
at 1016 n.193 (citations omitted).
65. See Note, supra note 39, at 717 (citations omitted).
66. See Note, supra note 1, at 1003. Defendants in product liability suits may
lose business in the marketplace if they absorb their increased liability and insurance
premiums by raising the prices of their products. See id. Companies who are unable
to raise their prices may decide not to purchase liability insurance, but instead may
establish a claims fund and bear the risk themselves. See id. at 1016 n.193. One
company opted to go out of business rather than purchase product liability insurance
at a cost of 10% of its annual sales. See id., (citing Wall St. J., June 3, 1976, at 1, col.
1).
67. See id. at 1003. Because industry-wide liability increases the number of
plaintiffs who can recover, the cost of doing business is increased for all manufactur-
ers. This additional cost may be enough to put smaller manufactuers out of business.
See id. at 1005 n.129. A policy whereby smaller businesses are forced out and the
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but nevertheless liable also find themselves in unenviable positions.6
Given the relaxation of rules of causation, particularly abrogation of
the requirement that the "wrongdoing defendant" be identified,
many plaintiffs are now free to pick and choose their target defend-
ants in toxic tort actions.69 The large manufacturing enterprises are
easily recognizable and claimants undoubtedly realize that the poten-
tial for recovery is greater from the "deeper pockets" 70 of the large
companies. Furthermore, large manufacturers who tend to keep
more detailed records may be more readily identified by those plain-
tiffs who still sue under traditional theories of liability which require
that the manufacturer be identified. 7' Therefore, large companies are
open to "double exposure" under both traditional and market share
theories of liability. 72
control of larger business strengthened may seriously affect the economic structure of
American industry. See id. at 1005.
68. See Note, supra note 39, at 716-17.
69. Szndell, 26 Cal. 3d at 616, 607 P.2d at 939, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 147 (Richard-
son, J., dissenting). See also Fischer, supra note 17, at 1649-50.
For a discussion of theories of liability which do not require that the plaintiff
identify the manufacturer who caused the plaintiffs injury, see notes 32-34 and ac-
companying text supra.
70. See Note, supra note 39, at 716-17.
Justice Richardson, dissenting in Stndell, pointed out the unfairness which may
result when the manufacturer identification element is abolished and the defendant's
wealth becomes a factor in determining liability:
This "deep pocket" theory of liability, fastening liability on defendants pre-
sumably because they are rich, has understandable popular appeal and
might be tolerable in a case disclosing substantially stronger evidence of
causation. . . . But as a general proposition, a defendant's wealth is an
unreliable indicator of fault, and should play no part, at least consciously,
in the legal analysis of the problem. In the absence of proof that a particu-
lar defendant caused or at least probably caused plaintiff's injuries, a de-
fendant's ability to bear the cost thereof is no more pertinent to the
underlying issue of liability than its "substantial" share of the relevant mar-
ket. A system priding itself on "equal justice under law" does not flower
when the liabdiiy as well as the damage aspect of a tort action is determined
by a defendant's wealth.
Szndell, 26 Cal. 3d at 618, 607 P.2d at 941, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 149 (Richardson, J.
dissenting) (emphasis in original).
71. When the "wrongdoing defendant" can be identified, that defendant will, of
course, be liable for 100% of the plaintiffs damages under traditional theories of tort
liability. See Note, supra note 50, at 1192-93. Those manufacturers who keep more
detailed records, or who have a more distinct product shape or color will be subject to
double exposure, bearing full responsibility where identification can be made, and
market share liability in other cases. Id.
72. See id. One commentator has claimed that the targeting of large businesses
is justified, since imposing liability on such manufacturers may compel the manufac-
turers to set safety and quality standards for the entire industry. See Note, supra note
1, at 1005. According to this commentator, "If all manufacturers are to be held liable
for the similar products generated by the various members of the industry, the larger
manufacturers, who have the most to lose through products liability, would have an
incentive to organize the industry and attempt to set production quality standards."
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Such far-reaching economic consequences will not be confined to
businesses, however. Consumers will be affected by these practices as
well, since the imposition of liability without proof will cause the pric-
ing system in the affected industries to reflect a cost not rightfully
placed upon it. 7 3 Furthermore, since this liability is to be imposed
well after a given product is marketed, the resulting losses will have to
be spread over other product lines and will cause an increase in the
cost of safe, beneficial products. 4 The revenue generated by these
price increases will not be sufficient to recoup all of the losses arising
from the arbitrary imposition of liability. Consequently, some manu-
facturers will necessarily become insolvent. Thus, in so extending lia-
bility, a plaintiff's potential recovery will necessarily be diminished as
funds available to pay judgments are depleted.7 5 The irony of this
cycle is that, in an attempt to strengthen a plaintiff's ability to re-
cover, recovery may actually become less certain.
Considering the potential economic problems which can result
from the development of relaxed rules applicable to product liability
litigation, one would expect that those fashioning the proposed fed-
eral product legislation would attempt to avert such a crisis. The
proposed federal law, however, would only serve to exacerbate these
economic problems. Under the proposed legislation, a court would
be empowered to reallocate to other defendants any portion of a judg-
ment which is deemed uncollectable from the party against whom it
is assessed. 76 Therefore, if one product manufacturer becomes insol-
vent, its burden would simply be passed along to another until that
entity also became unable to pay. Consequently, a shrinking pool of
Id. It would appear impossible to reconcile such a view with our Anglo-American
tradition of justice.
73. See Note, supra note 39, at 711.
74. Note, supra note 49, at 1201. For example, DES liability costs cannot be
confined to DES because it is no longer used as a miscarriage preventive. Id. Conse-
quently, to offset losses sustained through damage awards and insurance costs, drug
manufacturers have had to raise the prices of safe and beneficial drugs. Id.
75. See Comment, supra note 25, at 634.
76. S. 44, supra note 5, § 9(d), at 19. According to S. 44,
If a claimant has not been able to collect on a judgment in a product
liability action, and if the claimant makes a motion within 1 year after the
judgment is entered, the court shall determine whether any part of the obli-
gation allocated to a person who is a party to the action is not collectable
from such a person. Any amount of obligation which the court determines
is uncollectable from that person shall be reallocated to the other persons
who are parties to the action and to whom responsibility was allocated and
to the claimant according to the respective percentages of their responsibil-
ity, as determined under subsection (b)(2).
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"deep pockets" would be compelled to bear the burden until no more
"deep pockets" remained.
Such economic strain could only go on for so long before manu-
facturers would be compelled to take some responsive action. Indus-
try-wide liability, particularly if fostered by a federal product liability
act, certainly has the potential for causing a severe, detrimental im-
pact on the research and development of new products. 77 Rather
than deterring manufacturers from unsafe practices, this onerous lia-
bility could curtail production entirely. Fearing that every new prod-
uct could be a potential source of liability, 78 manufacturers might
stop producing new products or, if they continue to produce new
products, they would feel obligated to test those products exhaus-
tively for a protracted period of time. If a manufacturer produced a
drug today which cured leukemia, how could it be certain that this
drug would not produce harmful effects in the offspring of the person
who ingested the drug-particularly if the harmful effects did not
manifest themselves for twenty or more years after those offspring
were born? If the manufacturer delayed the marketing of the drug
until it could be absolutely certain that it would produce no harmful
effects, how many people would continue to suffer and die from
leukemia?
The proposed federal law does little to guide manufacturers and
give them confidence in the release of new products. Replete with
undefined terms, it poses more questions than it answers. It tells us
that a product is defective in construction if it "deviates" in a "mate-
rial" way from specifications, 7 9 and that a product is unreasonably
dangerous in design if the manufacturer, based on "sound support" in
the medical, scientific or technological community, knew or should
have realized the danger.8 0 Furthermore, the proposed Act states
77. See Note, supra note 48, at 1201. This commentator has suggested that the
Sindell market share approach encourages, through economic incentives, longer peri-
ods of testing to eliminate unsafe drugs. Id. However, it has been recognized cor-
rectly that the efficacy of more extensive testing is not guaranteed, and that the
benefit of such testing must be weighed against the cost of delayed release of new
products and potential cures. Id.
78. Note, supra note 1, at 1004. This commentator predicts that the vastly in-
creased risk of liability for product-related injuries will inevitably reduce the incen-
tive to continue research in the area of disease prevention and cure. Id.
79. S. 44, supra note 5, § 5(a), at 8. See also id. § 4, at 6-8. Section 4 of the
proposed "Product Liability Act" further provides that a manufacturer is liable to a
claimant if the claimant can establish that the product is "unreasonably dangerous"
in its construction, design, failure to warn, or failure to conform to an express war-
renty, and that this unreasonably dangerous aspect of the product was the proximate
cause of the injury. Id. § 4(a)(l)-(2), at 6-7.
80. Id. § 5(b), at 8-9. Recovery in a design defect action also requires that "a
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that liability hinges upon whether the means to eliminate a danger
.are within "practical, technological feasibility" 81-a term that is
rather obliquely defined by the act 82-and tells us that an alternative
design is better than the one chosen if the "hazards it eliminates are
greater than any new hazards it creates for any persons and for any
uses. "83
These vague and convenient labels do not define a manufac-
turer's duty. It is unlikely that uniform standards would emerge since
the state courts must give these terms meaning. The manufacturing
community actually would be in a worse position if the proposed Act
were adopted since concerned manufacturers would have no gui-
dance and even less certainty than under existing case law. Further-
more, under S. 44 many manufacturers may feel that improved
quality control on their part would be meaningless, because without
the tightening of the requirements of causative defendant identifica-
tion, they may still be liable for the shoddy, unsafe practices of other
manufacturers.8 4 Even if product manufacturers do improve their
design and production processes, the proposed federal law would give
them no guidance with regard to product warning. Again, the pro-
posed Act utilizes terms of convenience without substance.8 5
It would be much more prudent for manufacturers who are con-
cerned with their liability to rely on existing precedent while seeking
to convince the courts to adopt more equitable common law rules.
The common law obviously provides much more flexibility, as well as
the opportunity for reevaluation, than does an unyielding statute.
D. Insurance
Assuming that liability can in some way be imposed and allo-
cated equitably among potentially responsible defendants in a toxic
means to eliminate the danger that caused the harm was within practical technologi-
cal feasibility." Id. § 5(b)(2), at 9.
81. Id.
82. See id. § 2(8), at 3. "[P]ractical technological feasibility" is defined in the bill
as "the technical, medical, and scientific knowledge relating to the safety of a product
which, at the time of production or manufacture of a product, was developed, avail-
able and capable of use in the manufacture of a product, and economically feasible
for use by a manufacturer." Id.
83. Id. § 5(e)(2)(B), at 10.
84. See note, supra note 1, at 1004.
85. See S. 44, supra note 5, § 6, at 11-15. For example, the proposed legislation
requires that part of the claimant's case is to establish that the "warnings or instruc-
tions, if provided would have led a reasonably prudent product user either to decline
to use the product or to use it in a manner so as to avoid harm of the type alleged by
the claimant." Id. § 6(b)(4), at 12. This subjective standard provides no guidance to
manufacturers seeking to include adequate warnings with their products.
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tort action, the damage awards will inevitably come to rest upon their
insurers. This, of course, assumes that the defendant manufacturers
are insured. However, the recent trend toward the imposition of in-
dustry-wide liability has the potential for increasing product liability
insurance rates even higher than they have been in the past, thereby
putting such insurance out of the reach of some manufacturers.8 6
The difficulty manufacturers may encounter in obtaining affordable
insurance is a crucial concern. Yet an even more pressing problem is
determining which insurer should be burdened with the judgment, or
at what point insurance coverage attaches.8 7 The comprehensive
general liability policies which are typically involved in toxic tort
cases make coverage dependent upon the happening of an "occur-
rence" within the policy period. 8 Because a plaintiff may have been
exposed to the products of several manufacturers during the course of
several decades of exposure, and because each manufacturer may
have had various insurers during that time span, courts must deter-
mine which insurers are obligated to indemnify a manufacturer in a
particular case.8 9
In struggling with the question of insurer liability for asbestos-
related injury claims, courts have devised three theories as to when
insurance coverage is triggered. 9° The first of these theories-the ex-
posure or pro rata theory-maintains that an injury occurs upon ini-
tial exposure to the hazardous substance.9 1 Thus, under this theory
all insurers who have provided coverage during the period a plaintiff
86. See Note, supra note 1, at 1003. Over the last several years, increasingly
generous awards granted to an increasingly large number of plaintiffs have caused
insurance rates to skyrocket. See id. The expansion of liability under the market
share theory would raise the cost of products liability insurance even further. See id.
For a discussion of the impact that increased products liability insurance premiums
have had on manufacturers, see notes 63-66 and accompanying text supra.
87. For example, the time which elapses between a plaintiffs initial exposure to
asbestos and the manifestation of asbestosis may be considerable. In many instances,
asbestos manufacturers have had different product liability insurers over that period
or have been insured for only part of the time involved. See Mansfield, supra note 11,
at 875-77.
88. See id. at 875. The operative word "occurrence" has been defined as "an
accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to conditions, which results in
bodily injury or property damage neither expected nor intended from the standpoint
of the insured." DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, ANNOTATED COMPREHENSIVE
GENERAL LIABILITY INSURANCE POLICY § 1.08 (1979).
89. See Mansfield, supra note 11, at 875.
90. For a detailed discussion of how courts have grappled with the problem of
insurance coverage for asbestos-related diseases, see Note, Asbestos-Related Diseases
Trigger Insurer's Duty to Defend and Indemnif When the Diseases Become Reasonably Capable
Of Diagnosis, 28 VILL. L. REV. 1335 (1983).
91. See Mansfield, supra note 11, at 876. Proponents of the exposure theory rely
on medical evidence that upon the first inhalation of an asbestos fiber which reaches
a terminal alvelous, a histological reaction takes place. Id. This reaction, proponents
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was exposed to the hazardous substance may be held jointly and sev-
erally liable.92 Since the harm insured against is deemed to have oc-
curred at exposure, an insurer who provided coverage at the time of a
plaintiff's exposure is not relieved from liability simply because it no
longer insures the defendant at the time the suit is brought.93 The
exposure theory has been followed by the Sixth Circuit in Insurance
Company of North America v. Forty-Eight Insulations .94 Noting that "bod-
ily injury" and "occurrence" as used in the policies are inherently
ambiguous terms in the context of a progressive disease, 95 the Sixth
Circuit found that "bodily injury" occurs upon initial inhalation of
asbestos fibers and need not rise to the level of a disease.96 The Forty-
Eight court then held each insurer liable for its pro rata share of the
damages as determined by the length of the plaintiffs exposure to
asbestos manufacturered by the company that the insurer had in-
sured. 97 The manufacturer was also responsible for its share of the
of the exposure theory argue, should be considered a "bodily injury" within the
meaning of the insurance contract. Id.
92. See, e.g., Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974). For a discussion of Borel, see note 57 supra.
93. See Mansfield, supra note 11, at 876. For example, if a plaintiff were exposed
to asbestos in a shipyard from 1942 to 1946, the insurer who provided coverage for
those years would bear the entire burden for damages even though the diagnosis for
the asbestos-related disease was made in 1975 and the suit filed in 1976. Id. at 876.
94. 633 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir. 1980). Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc. was a manufac-
turer of products containing asbestos. Id. at 1214. Since 1955, it had insurance cov-
erage under various policies issued by five different insurance companies. Id. at 1215.
One of the insurance companies brought a declaratory judgment action to settle the
dispute over which insurers were liable under the various policy provisions. Id. at
1216. For a more detailed discussion of Forty-Eight, see Note, Each Insurer Which Pro-
vides Coverage During Workers' Exposure to Asbestos Is Proportionately and Individually Liable
to Defend and Indemnify its Insured, 26 VILL. L. REv. 1080 (1981).
95. 633 F.2d at 1222. Rejecting the claim that asbestosis should be treated the
same as any disease, the court stated, "Cumulative disease cases are different from the
ordinary accident or disease situation." Id. at 1219 (emphasis supplied by the court).
This conclusion of the Forty-Eight court was based on three considerations. First, the
underlying theory of liability was a continual failure to warn which had led to a
continuous inhalation of asbestos particles. Id. Second, expert testimony had estab-
lished that tissue injury occurs upon initial inhalation, and that the time when asbes-
tosis manifests itself is not the time when the disease occurs. Id. Finally, the court
stated that "we are bound to broadly construe the insurance policies to promote cov-
erage." Id.
96. Id. at 1222-23. Since the policy defined "bodily injury" as "bodily injury,
sickness or disease . . . ," the court felt it was clear that "bodily injury" should be
construed to include the tissue damage which takes place upon initial inhalation of
asbestos. Id. Each breath of asbestos fibers constituted a separate bodily injury
under this rationale. Id.
97. Id. at 1225. The court did not impose joint and several liability because
under this pro rata assignment each insurer's liability was individual and proportion-
ate. Id. The Forty-Eight court explained that "where an insurer can show that no
exposure to asbestos manufactured by its insured took place during certain years,
then that insurer cannot be liable for those years." Id.
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plaintiffs exposure which had occurred during periods when the
manufacturer was uninsured. 98
The second theory as to when an injury is deemed to occur for
purposes of insurance coverage-the "manifestation theory"-looks
to the insurance coverage applicable at the time when a claimant's
asbestos-related condition "manifests" itself.99 The First Circuit
adopted the manifestation theory in Eagle-Picher Industries v. Liberty
Mutual Insurance Co. 100 The court in Eagle-Picher advanced their rea-
sons for adopting the manifestation theory of insurance coverage.
First, the court noted that medical experts had agreed that the injury
caused by asbestos inhalation does not occur simultaneously with the
initial exposure but rather that some time necessarily must pass
before tissue destruction begins.101 Second, the court decided that in
giving these insurance policies their common and ordinary meaning,
the language of the policies was more compatible with the manifesta-
tion theory because the policies at issue clearly distinguished between
the accident or exposure and the resulting injury or disease.10 2 Third,
98. Id. at 1224. The Forty-Eight court assessed the manufacturer for its pro rata
share of both damages and the cost of the defense for those years in which the manu-
facturer had no insurance. Id. at 1224-25.
99. Mansfield, supra note 11, at 876. Under this view, the time at which the
disease becomes known or should have become known to the plaintiff is the control-
ling date for determining Which insurance policy applies. Id.
100. 682 F.2d 12 (1st Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1279 (1983). Eagle-
Picher, a manufacturer of asbestos-containing products, and a defendant in lawsuits
for personal injury and wrongful death allegedly resulting from inhalation of asbes-
tos, brought a declaratory judgment action seeking a declaration of the rights, liabili-
ties, and obligations of its various insurers. Id. at 15-16. The United States District
Court for the District of Massachusetts, relying on medical evidence relating to asbes-
tosis, the common meaning of insurance policy language, and the policy of constru-
ing insurance contracts to promote coverage, adopted the manifestation theory of
insurance coverage. Eagle-Picher Indus. v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 523 F. Supp.
110, 115-16 (D. Mass. 1981),affd &modified, 682 F.2d 12 (1st Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
103 S. Ct. 1279 (1983). The district court also concluded that a disease manifests
itself either at the date of diagnosis or, if no diagnosis, at the date of death. Id. at 118.
Eagle-Picher cross-appealed, arguing that all policies in force from the time of the
initial exposure until and including the time of manifestation, are responsible for an
asbestos claim and that the district court chose the wrong manifestation date. 682
F.2d at 16. For a comprehensive discussion of Eagle-P'cher, see Note, supra note 90.
101. 682 F.2d at 18. The First Circuit relied on medical evidence offered in the
district court which supported the view that injury does not occur simultaneously
with the initial exposure, but instead occurs when the asbestos fibers embed in the
lung and evade the body's internal defense mechanisms. Id. (citing 523 F. Supp. at
115). Furthermore, the First Circuit noted that exposure to asbestos would not inevi-
tably result in injury since these defense mechanisms may remove the fibers before
they become embedded in the lung tissue. 682 F.2d at 19.
102. Id. The Eagle-Picher court observed that if "exposure to asbestos [were]
intended to trigger coverage, the policy language would likely have reflected this
intent, rather than defining an 'occurrence' in part as a 'continuous or repeated' ex-
posure to conditions." Id. The court asserted that the complaining party would as-
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the First Circuit reasoned that in order to effectuate the insurance
policies' purpose of providing coverage, all doubts regarding the in-
terpretation of these policies should be resolved in favor of cover-
age. 0 3 The court then concluded that the responsible insurer is the
one who provided coverage when the asbestos-related disease became
reasonably capable of medical diagnosis.10 4 In contrast, the Sixth
Circuit in Forty-Eight had reasoned that the application of a manifes-
tation theory would unfairly deny coverage to the defendant manu-
facturer, since no insurer would extend coverage to include later years
when a disease with a long latency period might manifest itself.10 5
The third theory regarding when an asbestos-related injury oc-
curs for insurance coverage purposes-known as the "continuous trig-
ger" or "everybody pays" theory-is a hybrid of the exposure and
manifestation theories. The continuous trigger theory was adopted
by the District of Columbia Circuit in Keene Corp. v. Insurance Company
of North Amer'ca. 10 6 In attempting to fulfill the reasonable expecta-
sume that the disease resulted when symptoms which impaired his health manifested
themselves or the disease's onset was capable of diagnosis. Id. In addition, the court
noted that the term "injury" is commonly associated with the result produced by the
infliction of "something that causes 'loss, pain, distress, or impairment.' " Id. (citing
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1164 (3d ed. 1966)). Asbesto-
sis, however, is normally considered to be a disease, not a bodily injury. 682 F.2d at
19. Therefore, the Eagle-Richer court said, "To state that the disease occurs when
these sub-clinical alterations take place, where, as here, the disease does not inevita-
bly or even usually result from sub-clinical changes, is to subvert the plain meaning
of 'disease' and to read the term entirely out of the policy." Id. at 19-20.
103. Id. at 23. Since Eagle-Picher was uninsured during the longest period of
exposure, and most asbestos-related disease claims were brought during the coverage
period, coverage based on the manifestation theory would best effectuate the policy's
purpose of providing insurance coverage. Id.
104. Id. at 25. The court thereby rejected both Eagle-Picher's contention that
"all policies in force from the time of initial exposure until and including the time of
manifestation are triggered by an asbestosis claim," and the district court's ruling
that the operative date is either the date of diagnosis, or, if no diagnosis, the date of
death. Id. at 16, 24.
105. 633 F.2d at 1219. The court in Forty-Eight explained,
The insurance policies before us are comprehensive general liability policies
which are designed to insure the manufacturer against products liability
suits. The contracting parties would expect coverage to parallel the theory
of liability. Otherwise . . . the manufacturer's coverage becomes illusory
since the manufacturer will likely be unable to secure any insurance cover-
age in later years when the disease manifests itself.
Id.
106. 667 F.2d 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1007 (1982). Keene
Corp. was named as a co-defendant in numerous suits alleging injury caused by expo-
sure to Keene's thermal insulation products which contained asbestos. Id. at 1038.
Keene tendered these asbestos-related damage cases to its insurance carriers for de-
fense and indemnification, but each company either denied complete responsibility
or accepted only partial responsibility. Id. at 1039. This prompted Keene to seek a
declaratory judgment to determine the extent to which each insurance carrier cov-
ered Keene's liability for the asbestos-related claims. Id. at 1038. The United States
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tions of the manufacturer when it purchased the policy, the Keene
court interpreted "bodily injury" to encompass "any part of the single
injurious process that asbestos-related diseases entail." 107 The court,
therefore, concluded that inhalation exposure,108 exposure-in-resi-
dence 0 9 and manifestation °10 of the resultant asbestos-related dis-
eases all trigger coverage under the insurance policies.' Even
though only part of the disease may have developed during any given
period of policy coverage, the Keene court nevertheless held each in-
surer liable for the full amount of the judgment rendered against the
asbestos manufacturer, subject only to policy limits and to policy pro-
visions governing liability allocation when more than one policy is
triggered by a single injury.112
Each of these approaches has its own major drawbacks. The
District Court for the District of Columbia held that the indemnification and defense
costs should be prorated among the insurance companies in accordance with the rela-
tive extent of exposure during their respective policy periods. 513 F. Supp. 47, 51
(D.D.C.),rev'd, 667 F.2d 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1007 (1982). The
District of Columbia Circuit rejected the district court's use of the exposure theory,
choosing instead to apply the continuous trigger theory of coverage. Keene, 667 F.2d
at 1039, 1047.
107. 667 F.2d at 1047. The Keene court explained that this definition included
"any part of the injurious process that begins with an initial exposure and ends with
manifestation of disease." Id.
108. Inhalation exposure is the initial inhalation of asbestos-containing material
into the body. Id. at 1042.
109. Exposure-in-residence is the subsequent development of the disease in the
body after inhalation exposure has occurred. Id.
110. Manifestation of the asbestos-related disease occurs when the "cellular
damage advances to the point of becoming a recognizable disease." Id. at 1043. For
additional discussion regarding the manifestation of asbestos-related disease, see note
97 and accompanying text supra and note 113 and accompanying text infra.
111. 667 F.2d at 1042-47.
112. Id. at 1047-48, 1050. The Keene court noted that although the continuous-
trigger theory imposes full liability on each insurer, where there is more than one
insurer, the other insurance provisions of each policy provide a formula for contribu-
tion from each insurer, thereby guaranteeing "that a single insurer would [not] be
saddled with full liability for any injury." Id. at 1050. The court pointed out that
this was a reasonable interpretation of these policies since the policies' language did
not provide for a reduction in the insurers' liability if an injury occured only in part
during a particular policy period. Id. at 1048. Therefore, the court said the only
logical interpretation of these policies is that once an insurer's coverage is triggered,
the insurer is liable for the full extent of the judgment against the insured, up to the
policy limits. Id. at 1048. The Keene court also stated that its holding was justified in
light of the expectations of the insured. Id. at 1041-42. The court noted the general
principle that
[t]he objectively reasonable expectations of applicants and intended benefi-
ciaries regarding the terms of insurance contracts will be honored even
though painstaking study of the policy provisions would have negated those
expectations.
Id. at 1042 n. 12 (citing Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions,
83 HARV. L. REV. 961, 967 (1970)).
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manifestation theory subjects an insurer to liability for harm which
may have occurred years earlier simply because it insures the manu-
facturer at the time of the manifestation of the disease.' 13 Further-
more, if a manufacturer's insurance coverage is terminated before a
disease manifests itself, the manufacturer will be totally without in-
surance coverage for the ensuing claims.1 14 Similarly, the exposure
theory may also prove inequitable. Under that theory, an insurer
may be held responsible years after coverage was terminated,' 15 while
the manufacturer who purchases a liability policy immediately after
exposure has occurred would remain completely uninsured for the
prior period. 116 Lastly, the continuous trigger theory only superfi-
cially resolves the inequities of the exposure and manifestation theo-
ries by triggering coverage throughout the injurious process. While it
avoids uncertainty by assuming insurance coverage for the insured,
the continuous trigger theory is unduly burdensome to insurers be-
cause it makes the insurer responsible even though the manufacturer
was voluntarily uninsured during a portion of the injurious process. 1 7
Further, the very existence of three distinct theories creates uncer-
tainty and prevents both insurers and manufacturers from predicting
their possible exposure.
In light of this confusion, and the very real necessity of alleviat-
113. Under the manifestation theory, insurance coverage is not triggered until
the disease has developed to the point that it is recognizable. See note 98 and accom-
panying text supra. Therefore, the insurer is without notice at the time at which the
insurance contract is entered that it may be liable for injuries incurred prior to
coverage.
114. Note, The Calculus of Insurer Liability in Asbestos-Related Disease Litigation:
Manifestation-Injurious Exposure-Continuous Trigger, 23 B.C.L. REV. 1141, 1168
(1982).
115. 667 F.2d at 1044 n.20. Under the exposure theory, insurance coverage is
triggered only at the time of exposure to the toxic material. Id. Therefore, the in-
surer is liable for exposure occurring during the policy period although notice of this
liability may not occur until years after the policy has been terminated. Id.
116. Id. at 1044. Under the exposure theory, purchase of insurance would not
provide the manufacturer with any coverage in the event of future liability for asbes-
tos-related injuries due to exposure prior to the purchase of insurance. Id.
117. Id. at 1047-49. The continuous trigger theory activates insurance coverage
when the initial exposure occurs. Id. at 1047-48. This coverage continues during the
period the asbestos-related injury is developing and through the manifestation of the
disease. Id.
Concurring in part in Keene, Judge Wald expressed her concern that the major-
ity's opinion "exempted asbestos manufacturers from all financial responsibility aris-
ing from a suit if the manufacturer had purchased insurance which covered any part
of the injury period." Id. at 1058 (Wald, J., concurring). A better solution to the
problem of intermittent insurance coverage, Judge Wald asserted, was for the manu-
facturer to bear a portion of the liability if it were voluntarily uninsured for part of
the injurious process. Id. at 1058 (Wald, J., concurring). For a discussion of the
continuous trigger theory, see notes 106-12 and accompanying text supra.
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ing it, any allegedly comprehensive uniform product liability act
should address and resolve the insurance coverage issue. Yet, the pro-
posed federal legislation mentions neither insurance nor the alloca-
tion of insurer liability. Guidelines for manufacturers and insurers
regarding the triggering and allocation of insurance coverage would
be appropriate in section 12 of the proposed Act, entitled "Time Lim-
itation on Liability,"'1 18 since such a section ostensibly would give an
indication of the legislative attitude toward the time of accrual of a
product liability cause of action. But rather than directly addressing
the issue of insurance coverage, the proposed Act instead avoids this
issue by providing for a twenty-five year statute of limitations appli-
cable when the harm alleged was caused by unsafe design, formula-
tion, or failure to give adequate warnings or instructions. ' 9
However, this limitations period is inapplicable when the harm
claimed was caused by the "cumulative effect of prolonged exposure
to a defective product" or "did not manifest itself until after the expi-
ration of that period.' °2 0 After thus removing the statute of limita-
tions, the proposed Act establishes nothing to take its place, thereby
avoiding the crucial question of when a cause of action does in fact
accrue under such circumstances. The proposed Act thus leaves in-
surers and manufacturers with the prospect of enormous liability, but
provides no guidance respecting the triggering of insurance coverage.
Consequently, manufacturers and insurers will still be compelled to
extensively litigate each claim on a case-by-case basis.
118. See S. 44, supra note 5, § 12, at 25. Section 12 of S. 44 is identical to § 12 of
S. 2631, the previously proposed "Product Liability Act," except that § 12(d) of S.
2631 has been eliminated. Section 12(d) of S. 2631 established that no products lia-
bility claim could be brought "more than two years from the time the claimant dis-
covered, or in the exercise of due diligence should have discovered, the harm." S.
2631,supra note 5, § 12(d), at 25. S. 2631 also contained an alternative section of the
statute of limitations for product liability actions which has not been included in S.
44. See id. § 12, at 26 (Alternative Section for Time Limitation Liability). The Re-
port of the Senate Commitee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation on S. 2631
does not explain either the Committee's deletion of§ 12(d) or its deletion of the alter-
native section on time limitations. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 3, at 50-52.
119. See S. 44,supra note 5, § 12(a)(1), at 25. Section 12(a)(l) provides in perti-
nent part as follows:
If any product is a capital good, no claim alleging unsafe design or formula-
tion . . .or failure to give adequate warnings or instructions. . . may be
brought for harm caused by such a product more than 25 years from the
date of delivery of the product to its first purchaser or lessee who was not
engaged in the business of selling or leasing the product or using the prod-
uct as a component in the manufacture of another product.
120. Id. § 12(b), at 26. This 25-year limitations period is also inapplicable when
the harm claimed was caused by "the manufacturer or product seller intentionally
misrepresenting facts about the product or fraudulently concealing information
about the product." Id.
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E. Statute of Limitations
Not only does the proposed federal legislation fail to address the
difficult issues concerning the allocation of insurance coverage, it also
fails to alleviate the uncertainty faced by both plaintiffs and defend-
ants in determining whether an action has been commenced in a
timely fashion.' 2' As applied to toxic torts, it has been claimed that
existing statutes of limitations allow manufacturers to expose the pub-
lic to dangers as long as no recognizable harm appears within the
generally brief limitations period within which personal injury ac-
tions may be commenced. 122
Possibly in an attempt to mitigate this supposed inequity, the
proposed "Product Liability Act" has established a twenty-five-year
statute of limitations for product liability actions involving capital
goods.' 23 This long limitations period admittedly would protect the
rights of victims whose exposure to a toxic substance caused a disease
characterized by a long latency period between exposure and mani-
festation. However, such a period is inequitable to manufacturers,
sellers, and their insurers. Manufacturers and insurers would be re-
quired to defend suits involving injury from exposure to products con-
taining toxic substances up to, and in certain cases beyond, twenty-
five years earlier.' 24 After such a time period, it is possible that
121. For the entire text of the statute of limitations provision of Senate Bill 44,
see id. § 12, at 25 (Time Limitation of Liability).
122. See Comment, supra note 12, at 1313-14. The common theories of recovery,
and hence the relatively short statute of limitations, utilized in asbestos and other
latent defect actions are negligence, warranty, and strict liability. See, e.g., Borel v.
Fiberboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1086 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 869 (1974).
A major purpose of product liability law is to place the risk of product-related
injury upon the party most able to distribute it-the manufacturer. See Birnbaum,
Unmasking the Test for Design Defect. From Negligence /to Warranty] to Strita Liabilty to
Negligence, 33 VAND. L. REV. 593, 596 (1980). The invocation of any statute of limi-
tations in delayed reaction torts shifts the risk of the product-related injury from the
manufacturer to the injured individual under the guise of preventing stale claims. As
a result, the defendant is immune from liability for its actions regardless of the plain-
tiff's diligence in asserting the claim. See Comment, supra note 12, at 1314.
For a survey of the various statute of limitations theories applicable to products
liability actions, see generally 3A L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY
§§ 39-40a (1982).
123. See S. 44,supra note 5, § 12(a)(1), at 25. For the text of§ 12(a)(1), see note
116 supra. For a comparison of§ 12 of S. 44 and § 12 of its predecessor, S. 2631, see
note 115 supra.
124. See generally S. 44, supra note 5, § 12, at 25. As noted previously, Senate Bill
44 eliminates the 25-year limitations period for cases where the alleged harm was
caused by "the cumulative effect of prolonged exposure to a defective product" or
when the harm did not manifest itself until after the 25-year period had expired. Id.
§ 12(b)(2)-(3), at 26. For a discussion of the statutory exemptions to the 25-year stat-
ute of limitations, see also note 117 and accompanying text supra.
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records and data vital to the defense of such an action, as well as
crucial employees involved in the design, manufacture, or sale of the
product may be unavailable. As a result, a manufacturer may be ex-
posed to virtually limitless liability without the ability to present an
adequate defense. Not only does the bill fail to set an outside time
limit for certain products susceptible to product liability claims, but it
also completely ignores an entire class of product liability cases in its
time limitation provisions. Section 12(a)(1) of the bill applies the
twenty-five-year statute of limitations only to "capital goods" and not
to consumer goods. 125 Thus, the Act fails to provide a statute of limi-
tations period to be applied in the many toxic tort cases involving
consumer goods. 126
Similarly, the proposed Act applies the twenty-five-year limita-
tions to claims "alleging unsafe design" or "failure to give adequate
warnings or instructions."'127 Yet, the bill fails to supply a limitations
period for claims which allege that a product was unreasonably dan-
gerous in construction or manufacture when it left the manufacturer's
control.' 2  In its report on S. 2631, the Senate Committee justified
the exemption of these claims, as well as those alleging breach of ex-
press warranty, by pointing out that strict liability was applicable in
125. S. 44, supra note 5, § 12(a)(1), at 25. Section 12(a)(2) of S. 44 defines a
capital good as any product other than a motor vehicle or any component part of
such a product which is both depreciable under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954,
as amended, and was "(A) used in a trade or business; (B) held for the production of
income; or (C) sold, leased, or donated to a governmental or private entity for the
production of goods, for training, for demonstration or other similar purposes." Id.
§ 12(a)(2), at 25.
126. See id. § 12(a), at 25. See also SENATE REPORT, supra note 3, at 13 ("claims
for certain harms, such as harms from drugs, which do not manifest themselves until
many years after product use would not be barred by this section").
127. S. 44,supra note 5, § 12(a)(1), at 25. For the pertinent text of§ 12(a)(1), see
note 119 supra.
128. Section 12(a)(1) states that the 25-year statute of limitation applies to
"claim[s] alleging unsafe design or formulation as provided in Section 5(b)." S. 44,
supra note 5, § 12(a)(1), at 25. Section 5(b) defines a design or formulation defect as
rendering a product unreasonably dangerous if at the time the product was made or
certified, whichever is earlier, a reasonably prudent manufacturer in the same or sim-
ilar circumstances would not have used that design or formulation. Id. § 5(b), at 8.
A separate section, § 5(a), deals with the construction or manufacturing defects
which render a product unreasonably dangerous and subjects the manufacturer to
liability if the product deviates from either design specifications, formula, or perform-
ance standards of the manufacturer, or otherwise identical units when it left the man-
ufacturer's control. Id. § 5(a). For the text of§ 5(a), see note 134 ahfra. Since section
12(a)(1) applies the 25-year statute of limitations only to § 5(b) products, it excludes
a manufacturer's liability for construction or manufacturing defects that were present
when the product left the manufacturer's control-the § 5(a) type of defect-from
this limitations period. For the text of these sections, see S. 44, supra note 5, § 5(a)-
(b), at 8; § 12(a)(1), at 25. See also S. 2631,supra note 6, § 5(a)-(b), at 9; § 12(a)(1), at
24 (identical to those sections of Senate Bill 44).
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such cases.' 29 Viewing strict liability as inconsistent with a time limi-
tation on the instigation of a cause of action, the Committee found
the exemption to be warranted. 30 Furthermore, the Committee re-
port noted that the limitations period for products liability actions
should be determined by state law.' 3' However, since the stated ob-
ject of the proposed federal legislation is to introduce certainty into
the area of products liability, 32 to leave this issue-which is charac-
terized by non-uniformity-open to state action demonstrates the fu-
tility of this federal legislation. 33
F. Miscellaneous Problems
One of the most misleading aspects of the proposed Federal
Product Liability Act is that it avoids addressing all of the problems
previously discussed, while doing so in a manner which makes it ap-
pear as if those problems have been solved. It accomplishes this
anomalous result by utilizing convenient all-encompassing terminol-
ogy which carries very little substance. Therefore, while the proposed
Act may appear to provide much-needed answers, it certainly does
not.
The first question, and perhaps the most obvious one, which the
proposed Act fails to address is precisely what type of "products" its
regulation encompasses. Section 2(10) of the proposed Act advances
a definition of "product," but this definition fails to specify whether
the Act pertains only to new products or if it covers used products as
well. 134 The bill also states in section 12(a) that its statute of limita-
129. SENATE REPORT, supra note 3, at 52.
130. Id. ("[t]he time limitations on liability applies only to design or formulation
or defect cases and to warning or instruction defect cases").
131. Id. at 50.
132. Id. at 7 ("a comprehensive Federal law ... would eliminate much of the
uncertainty and reduce the associated adverse effects of [the uncertainties in the
products liability tort-litigation system]").
For a discussion of the effect S. 44 would have on state law if enacted, see note 9
and accompanying text supra, and notes 133 & 147 and accompanying text infra.
133. See S. 44, supra note 5, § 3(c), at 6. Section 3(c) of the proposed federal
legislation states that the "Act supersedes any State law regarding matters governed
by this Act." Id.
134. S. 44, supra note 5, § 2(10), at 4. Section 2(10) provides that
'product' means any object, substance, mixture or raw material in a gase-
ous, liquid or solid state which is capable of delivery itself, or as an assem-
bled whole in a mixed or combined state or as a component part or
ingredient, which is produced for introduction into trade or commerce,
which has intrinsic economic value, and which is intended for sale or lease
to persons for commercial or personal use; 'product' does not include
human tissue or organs.
Id. Cf. S. 2631, supra note 6, § 2(10), at 4 (the definition of product is substantially
the same as that contained in S. 44).
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tions begins to run from the date of the product's delivery to its first
purchaser or lessee who is "not engaged in the business of selling or
leasing the product or using the product as a component in the manu-
facture of another product."' 35 At first glance, the "first purchaser"
provision appears to limit the application of the bill to new products.
But, it is entirely conceivable that a product could have been used for
a time by a person engaged in the business listed in section 12 and
then much later sold to its "first purchaser," as defined by the pro-
posed Act. Under such circumstances, given the twenty-five-year
statute of limitations, a manufacturer would be open to indefinite ex-
posure for harm allegedly caused by such a "used" product and
would find no relief in the proposed Act.
As previously noted, the proposed federal legislation utilizes simi-
larly indefinite and questionable terminology in attempting to define
the "duties" of a manufacturer. 36 Section 5(a) of the bill provides
that a product is unreasonably dangerous in construction or manufac-
ture if it deviates "in a material way" from specifications. 37 How-
ever, "material" is never defined and the Committee report does little
to clarify this point, stating only that if the deviation is not "material"
then the product is not unreasonably dangerous.138
Similarly, the proposed Act provides that a product is unreason-
ably dangerous because it lacks necessary warnings if the manufac-
turer either knew about the alleged danger or should have known
"based on knowledge which was reasonably accepted in the scientific,
technical or medical community."' 39 However, the bill does not ex-
135. S. 44,supra note 5, § 12(a)(l), at 25. For the pertinent text of§ 12(a)(1), see
note 119 supra.
136. For a discussion of the lack of guidance the proposed Act offers to manufac-
turers, see notes 79-85 and accompanying text supra.
137. S. 44, supra note 5, § 5(a), at 8. According to § 5(a), "[a] product is unrea-
sonably dangerous in construction or manufacture if, when the product left the con-
trol of the manufacturer, it deviated in a material way-() from the design
specifications, formula, or performance standards of the manufacturer; or (2) from
otherwise identical units manufactured to the same manufacturing specifications or
formula." Id. For further discussion of § 5(a), see note 128 supra.
138. SENATE REPORT, supra note 3, at 27 (citing Wiseman v. Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co., 29 Wash. App. 883, 887-88, 631 P.2d 976, 979-80 (1981)). Thus, the
Committee has defined the questionable term by using the term itself.
139. S. 44, supra note 5, § 6(b)(1), at 11. Section 6(b) states that
[a] product is unreasonably dangerous for lack of necessary warnings or in-
structions if the claimant establishes by a preponderance of the evidence
that at the time the product was sold-
(1) the manufacturer knew or, based on knowledge which was rea-
sonably accepted in the scientific, technical, or medical community for the
existence of the danger which caused the claimant's harm, should have
known about the danger which allegedly caused the claimant's harm;
(2) the manufacturer failed to provide the warnings or instructions
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plain or define what constitutes such reasonable acceptance. The
Committee report also does little to shed any light upon this question;
it only states that a manufacturer has a duty to keep abreast of devel-
opments in the "relevant learned communities" and is therefore pre-
sumed to know of "reasonably accepted" developments. 40  The
paucity of the Committee's explanation is exacerbated by the fact
that the crucial issue in product liability litigation often involves a
determination of what in fact was the state-of-the-art at the time a
given product was manufactured. Such a determination is never
reached without reference to lively debate among members of such
"relevant" communities, all advancing a position which each feels has
sound support and is "reasonably accepted." Although attempting to
establish a "uniform" standard, the proposed Act will not serve to
eliminate these debates, but will instead encourage them through the
very terminology it employs.
A comparable problem is presented by section 5(b)(2) of the bill
which provides that a product is not unreasonably dangerous in de-
sign unless "a means to eliminate the danger that caused the harm
was within practical technological feasibility."' 4' This "practical
technological feasibility" is ostensibly defined by the proposed Act,
but this definition lends no more guidance or certainty than does the
"reasonably accepted" criteria 42 previously discussed.
In addition to its failure to define accurately and adequately the
many terms crucial to the area of product liability litigation, the pro-
that a reasonably prudent manufacturer in the same or similar circum-
stances would have provided with respect to the danger which caused the
harm alleged by the claimant, given the likelihood that the product would
cause harm of the type alleged by the claimant and given the seriousness of
that harm;
(3) the manufacturer failed to provide those warnings or instructions
to the claimant or to another person in accordance with subsection (d)(l);
and
(4) those warnings or instructions, if provided, would have led a rea-
sonably prudent product user either to decline to use the product or to use
it in a manner so as to avoid harm of the type alleged by the claimant.
Id. § 6(b)(l)-(4), at 11-12. Section 6(b) of S. 44 does not substantively alter § 6(b) of
S. 2631. Compare S. 44,supra note 5, § 6(b), at 1l,with S. 2631,supra note 6, § 6(b), at11.
140. SENATE REPORT, supra note 3, at 33.
141. S. 44, supra note 5, § 5(b)(2), at 9.
142. Id. § 2(8), at 3. Section 2(8) of the proposed federal legislation provides
that " 'practical technological feasibility' means the technical, medical, and scientific
knowledge relating to the safety of a product which, at the time of production or
manufacture of a product, was developed, available and capable of use in the manu-
facture of a product, and economically feasible for use by a manufacturer." Id. Cf.
S. 2631, supra note 6, § 2(8), at 3 (containing a similar definition of "practical techno-
logical feasibility").
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posed Act if implemented would leave many glaring gaps in the field
of products liability law. As one commentator has noted, "It is im-
possible to codify the product law to deal with every situation that
gives rise to litigation." 143 This is particularly true in the area of toxic
torts where litigation is in its relative infancy and numerous new is-
sues are bound to appear. If the proposed Act cannot address those
questions which have already arisen in this area, it certainly is inade-
quate to handle any issues yet to be recognized. Given the inevitable
void, state courts will have to fill in the gaps in the legislation, since
they are expressly given jurisdiction. 144 Because each state court sys-
tem is an independent entity, each jurisdiction will be forced to deal
with these gaps according to its own determination of policy. Conse-
quently, the federal goal of "uniformity" in product liability could
only be achieved through exhaustive review by the Supreme Court. 145
Furthermore, since the proposed Act is applicable only to product
liability actions, a dual tort system will inevitably be created in each
state. 146 Litigants in product liability actions would thus receive
either the benefit or the detriment of the federal Act-depending
upon one's viewpoint-while litigants in other tort actions and prod-
uct liability actions not covered by the proposed Act would continue
to proceed under existing common law. 147 The possible repercussions
in such a split system would invade the very foundations of tort law in
each state.
Most notably, the proposed Act's invasion of state tort law is evi-
143. Ghiardi, No. Federal Product Liability Legillatton, 11 BRIEF, May 1982, at 5-6.
144. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 3, at 21.
Section 3(c) of the proposed Act only preempts any state law which exists on the
subject matter of the Act. S. 44, supra note 5, § 3(c), at 6. For the text of § 3(c), see
note 133 supra.
The Conference Committee elaborated upon § 3(c), stating that "[i]t focuses on
the most important issues in product liability tort law and leaves other issues to the
individual States." SENATE REPORT, supra note 3, at 21. The Conference Committee
further cited that "[tihe Committee intends that where a matter is not addressed in
the act, it remains subject to applicable State law. In applying State law on matters
not covered by this act, courts and State legislatures may act in accord with their
own State's product liability tort law." Id. at 22.
145. SENATE REPORT, supra note 3, at 23. The Conference Committee con-
tended that § 3(c) "ensures that the rules set forth in the act are uniformly applied in
all product liability actions, regardless of where the harm occurred and regardless of
which court hears the claim. All courts, State and Federal, with jurisdiction over a
product liability action must apply the act." Id. This statement, however, minimizes
the fact that state product liability law will be applied in matters which the proposed
Act does not cover. For a discussion of this limitation to preemption, see notes 9 &
143 and accompanying text supra.
146. Ghiardi, supra note 143, at 7.
147. For a discussion of the extent to which the proposed Act preempts state
law, see notes 8, 144 & 145 and accompanying text -supra.
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denced by the inclusion of a "pure" comparative responsibility sec-
tion in the proposed legislation. 48 This system of negligence or fault
allocation has been included despite the fact that the majority of
states has adopted either a "modified" comparative negligence sys-
tem, 149 or retained the rule of common law negligence that a claim-
148. See S. 44, supra note 5, § 9, at 18. The provision in the proposed Act deal-
ing with comparative responsibility provides that
[alll claims under this Act shall be governed by the principles of com-
parative responsibility. Comparative responsibility attributed to the claim-
ant's conduct under section 10(c) shall not bar recovery in a product
liability action, but shall reduce any damages awarded to the claimant in
an amount proportionate to the responsibility of the claimant.
Id. § 9(a), at 18. Section 9(c) of the proposed Act then states that liability will be "in
proportion to [each party's] percentage of responsibility for the claimant's harm." Id.
§ 9 (c), at 19. Section 9(d) permits reallocation of an uncollectible judgment against a
co-defendant joint tortfeasor among the remaining joint tortfeasors in proportion to
the percentages established in § 9(b)(2). Id. § 9(d), at 19.
Section 9 of S. 44 is basically the same as the comparative responsibility provi-
sion which appeared in S. 2631. Compare S. 44, supra note 5, § 9, at 18 with S. 2631,
supra note 6, § 9, at 18.
Only a handful of states have, like the proposed Act, adopted a "pure" theory of
comparative responsibility in products liability actions. See, e.g., Kaatz v. State, 540
P.2d 1037, 1049 (Alaska 1975), modifted, 572 P.2d 775 (Alaska 1977); Butaud v. Sub-
urban Marine & Sporting Goods, 555 P.2d 42 (Alaska 1976) (extending the doctrine
of pure comparative negligence in Kaatz to products liability actions); Daly v. Gen-
eral Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1978) (ex-
tending the "pure" comparative fault doctrine to products liability actions); Li v.
Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 826, 532 P.2d 1226, 1242, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858, 874
(1975) (adopting the "pure" form of comparative responsibility as a "first step in...
a proper and just direction"); West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80 (Fla.
1976) (allowing a comparative negligence defense in a strict liability action); Hoff-
man v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431, 440 (Fla. 1973); Placek v. Sterling Heights, 405 Mich.
638, 275 N.W.2d 511 (1979) (the "pure" form of comparative negligence was adopted
to replace contributory negligence in products liability actions); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 52-572(h) (West 1982). MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-7-15 (1972). For a complete
survey of the comparative negligence doctrine in every jurisdiction, see generally C.
HEFT & C.J. HEFT, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE MANUAL §§ 2.40-3.580 (1978 &
Supp. 1982).
149. For jurisdictions recognizing the modified comparative negligence system
in products liability actions, see, e.g., Wagnon v. Barker, 236 Ark. 55, 364 S.W.2d 314
(1963) (a plaintiff's contributory negligence, under comparative negligence statute
will not bar recovery if his negligence is less than that of the defendant); Mountain
Mobile Mix, Inc. v. Gifford, 628 P.2d 133 (Colo. App. 1981) (adopting the modified
comparative negligence approach whereby recovery will not be denied to a plaintiff
if his negligence is less than or equal to that of the defendant), rev'd on other grounds,
660 P.2d 883 (1983); Bissen v. Fujii, 51 Hawaii 636, 466 P.2d 429 (1970) (adopting
the "less than" theory of comparative negligence under comparative negligence stat-
ute); Sandifer Motors Inc. v. City of Roeland Park, 6 Kan. App. 2d 308, 628 P.2d 239
(Kan. Ct. App. 1981) (adopting the "less than" theory); Jackson v. Frederick's Motor
Inn, 418 A.2d 168 (Me. 1980) ("less than" theory); Jack Frost, Inc. v. Engineering
Bldg. Components Co., 304 N.W.2d 346 (Minn. 1981) ("less than" theory); Leyva v.
Smith, 357 S.W.2d 169 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977) (adopting the "less than or equal to"
variation of the modified comparative negligence doctrine under comparative negli-
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ant's contributory negligence acts as a complete bar to recovery. 150
Such state-by-state determinations have been formulated after careful
consideration of the public policy and perceived needs of each partic-
ular jurisdiction. In addition, each state has formulated detailed pro-
cedural rules which comport with these policy determinations.15'
Therefore, the introduction of a "foreign" comparative responsibility
rule into product liability actions would serve to undermine the legiti-
mate policies of many states, and would also necessitate the creation
of an entirely new body of procedural rules to handle those cases.
The inherent unfairness of requiring different policies and procedures
in some types of product liability actions but not in other product
liability and tort actions-not to mention the senselessness of such a
scheme-militates against the establishment of such a dual system.
Similarly, the inequity of a dual system is clearly evidenced by
the inclusion of a punitive damages section in the proposed federal
Act.152 As with comparative responsibility, the allowance of punitive
damages is a matter of state policy.'5 3 The various states have taken
gence statute). For a survey of comparative negligence in every jurisdiction, see gen-
erally HEFT, supra note 148.
The Pennsylvania legislature also adopted a form of modified comparative re-
sponsibility in its Comparative Negligence Act. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7102
(Purdon 1982) ("the fact that the plaintiff may have been guilty of contributory neg-
ligence shall not bar a recovery by the plaintiff. . . where such negligence was not
greater than the causal negligence of the defendant . . . but any damages sustained
by the plaintiff shall be diminished in proportion to the amount of negligence attrib-
uted to the plaintiff"). For a more detailed discussion of this statute, see generally
Comparative Neghgence in Pennsylvania, 24 VILL. L. REV. 419 (1979).
150. For an example of a jurisdiction which continues to apply the common law
doctrine of contributory negligence to product liability actions, see, Mackey v.
Greenview Hosp., Inc., 587 S.W.2d 249 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).
151. Ghiardi, supra note 143, at 7 ("[e]ach state has different rules as to joinder,
defenses, releases, settlements, setoffs, contribution and indemnity").
152. See S. 44, supra note 5, § 13, at 26. Section 13 of the proposed federal legis-
lation specifies that punitive damages can be awarded if the claimant establishes by
clear and convincing evidence that his injury was the result of the manufacturer's or
product seller's reckless disregard for the product user's or consumer's safety. Id.
§ 13(a)(l), at 26.
Section 13(b) delineates four factors that the trier of fact must consider in mak-
ing its determination whether to award punitive damages. First, the trier of fact
must consider the defendant's awareness of the likelihood that serious harm would
arise from the sale or manufacture of the product. Id. § 13(b)(1), at 27. Second, the
trier of fact must consider the defendant's conduct upon discovery of the risk of
harm. Id. § 13(b)(2), at 27. Third, the trier of fact must consider the duration of the
conduct and any concealment of it by the defendant. Id. § 13(b)(3). Finally, the
trier of fact must consider the extent to which the claimant's own negligence contrib-
uted to the harm. Id. § 13(b)(4), at 27.
153. Ghiardi, supra note 143, at 7 (whether punitive damages are to be allowed
in product cases or any other civil action is a matter of state policy; it is an unwar-
ranted invasion of state autonomy to legislate for or against punitive damages on a
federal level).
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differing approaches regarding the applicability of punitive damages
to product liability actions in accordance with the prevailing policy of
each jurisdiction. 154 However, the proposed Act presumes to ignore
these policy determinations and grants punitive damages if certain
indefinite criteria are met. Section 13 of the bill defines the standard
for imposing punitive damages by utilizing phrases such as "con-
scious, flagrant indifference to safety" and "extreme departure from
accepted practice. ' 155 These terms are certainly susceptible of more
than one judicial interpretation, particularly in the area of toxic torts
where the manufacturer's knowledge of the safety of his product may
be crucial to the determination of liability. In a jurisdiction that does
not allow punitive damages in other types of tort actions, a judge who
may be particularly outraged by certain conduct would be authorized
to award those damages under the proposed Act, thereby contraven-
ing an established state policy against punitive awards. While the
very nature of toxic tort cases may bring safety questions to the fore-
front, this necessary focus should not in and of itself be sufficient to
subject a manufacturer to punitive damages when all other tort de-
fendants in that jurisdiction are immune from that form of liability.
A disparity also exists between the statute of limitations estab-
lished by the proposed Act and the period generally established for
personal injury actions in most states. While section 12 of the bill
gives a claimant twenty-five years from the date of product delivery
to commence his action,1 56 most states set the statute of limitations for
personal injuries at a much shorter time. 157 Allowing a claimant al-
leging injury by a product to have a substantially longer period of
time within which to bring an action than a claimant injured in some
other manner is a state of affairs which cannot be justified.
The folly of this dual system becomes more apparent when it is
applied to a single fact situation. For example, an auto accident may
give rise to a lawsuit in which the plaintiff joins both the driver and
the manufacturer of an allegedly defective auto. 58 Under these cir-
cumstances, co-defendants could be subjected to different compara-
tive negligence calculations, punitive damage awards, and even
154. For an analysis of the states' position on the awarding of punitive damages
in product liability actions, see generally J. GHIARDI & J. KIRCHER, PUNITIVE DAM-
AGES: LAW AND PRACTICE 6.01-38 (1981 & Supp. 1982).
155. S. 44, supra note 5, § 13(a)(2), at 26.
156. For the text of the proposed Act's statute of limitations provision, see note
119 and accompanying text supra. For further discussion of the proposed Act's stat-
ute of limitations provision, see notes 120-28 and accompanying text supra.
157. 3 R. HURSH & H. BAILEY, AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY
§§ 17.7-17.8 & nn.57 & 62 (2d ed. 1975).
158. Ghiardi, supra note 143, at 7-8.
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statutes of limitations although a single injury is alleged which has
arisen out of a single occurrence.1 59 One commentator has addressed
the difficulty of meshing federal legislation with state tort law rules,
but has concluded that the proposed Act would focus it almost exclu-
sively on product liability problems, leaving procedural areas to state
control. 1 0 However, it is the very drafting of the Act which has cre-
ated the problem of how to integrate federal and state products liabil-
ity laws. By focusing exclusively on product liability issues, the
proposed Act ignores the reality that product liability cases do not
occur in a vacuum and that they often entail non-product litigants
and issues beyond the realm of product liability. Because of the di-
versity inherent in many product liability cases, state procedural con-
trols would be inadequate to integrate the often widely divergent
state and federal requirements. Consequently, given the very real
problems which this dual system presents, the justification of the fed-
eral legislation as a way of introducing certainty into product liability
litigation becomes very weak and unsupportable.
III. NEED FOR THE PROPOSED ACT
In light of the many practical and legal questions which the pro-
posed federal Product Liability Act raises but fails to answer, 6 1 it is
apparent that such a law is neither logical nor necessary. Further-
more, "redrafting" the proposed Act-no matter how carefully
159. Id. at 8.
160. Schwartz, Yes: Federal Product Liabilty Legisation, 11 BRIEF, May 1982, at 4,
9-10.
161. In addition to the legal issues previously raised, the proposed federal Prod-
uct Liability Act also raises potential constitutional questions. See generally Ghiardi,
supra note 143, at 6. Challengers could first attack the legislation on the grounds that
it invades the sovereignty of the states as guaranteed by the tenth amendment. See id.
Challengers might also assail aspects of the Act as depriving defendant manufactur-
ers due process of law. See Comment, Pol'cy and Proof. Shiting the Burden of Proof in a
Product Li;abilty Case, 34 BAYLOR L. REV. 83, 102 (1982). For example, the proposed
Act does not require an injured plaintiff to identify the manufacturer who produced
the product that caused his injury; the burden is upon the defendant to exculpate
himself. See S. 44, supra note 5, § 4, at 6. One comentator has noted that if an indus-
try or some of its members were held "liable without proof of causation this would
result essentially in the taking of property of all named defendants in order to pay for
the harm that may have been caused by only one defendant, or by one who is not
even a party of the lawsuit." Comment, supra, at 102.
Because of the possibility of constitutional attack, the Act's goals of uniformity
and certainty will be greatly undermined. Courts that found the Act in accord with
the federal constitutional mandate would apply its provisions, while those finding the
Act unconstitutional would ignore the federal law and resort to prior state law. Reso-
lution of these constitutional challenges would take years and, if the Act were to be
found unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, the states again would be left to their
own devices in resolving product disputes.
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done-cannot even approach a solution to these monumental
problems. Product liability very simply is an area of the law which
should be left to the states, because each state is best able to ascertain
the needs of its citizens and formulate ways to satisfy those needs.
Many states have already enacted product liability legislation or are
in the process of doing so. Additionally, the common law in most
states reflects a step toward dealing with problems created by product
liability litigation and constitutes a basis upon which further solutions
can be formulated. 162 For example, in the area of toxic tort litigation,
a wealth of case law dealing with injuries allegedly attributable to
DES or asbestos reflects a reasoned approach to dealing with such
claims. Concededly, the reasoning utilized in many of these cases has
been criticized and the development of the law in this area is far from
complete. However, it is the very complexity of this area of product
liability which necessitates a gradual development of solutions to its
problems; no shorthand, "uniform" law can possibly accelerate this
process by anticipating and dealing with every possible problem
which has arisen or may yet arise.
Alleviating dissatisfaction with judicial theories or proposals in
the product liability area is best accomplished by overruling those
questionable cases by state legislation or by developing case law
which would lead product liability law down a totally different path.
At all costs, however, it is each unique, individual state which should
be given the task of reforming product liability law through legisla-
tion and judicial precedent. Only state legislatures and the judiciary
can measure public sentiment and public needs and incorporate them
into a useful body of law. No omniscient federal legislation can ac-
complish this result by mere speculation.
If indeed the federal government is compelled to alleviate per-
ceived problems in this field, it can always do so on a much more
restricted basis. For example, at the heart of all the DES and asbestos
cases lie the federal regulations and government standards which
proved to be woefully inadequate as time passed. As one commenta-
tor has noted, DES-related injuries are not so obviously the result of
someone's negligence, since a drug manufacturer may have relied
upon standards established by the federal Food and Drug Adminis-
tration. 163 Similarly, asbestos manufacturers long complied with gov-
ernment standards regarding permissive dust levels, only to discover
162. See 5 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY app. H-I (1982).
Thirty states have also enacted product liability legislation, and many others have
product liability bills pending in their legislatures. For the text of the enacted state
product liability statutes, see id.
163. Note, supra note 39, at 722-23. This commentator, however, maintains that
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years later that these standards were inadequate.1 54 The federal gov-
ernment, if genuinely concerned about the increase in toxic tort liti-
gation, should assume some financial responsibility for these losses or
at the very least increase the funding granted to supervisory agencies
so that a closer watch could be kept on production in this area.' 65
The federal government could also advocate the development and
passage of state product liability laws, and perhaps assist the states in
such steps if requested to do so. That type of activity would move the
United States closer to "uniform" product liability law, but would do
so in a much more logical and efficient manner. Certainly these steps
would help to reform the law much more than would the complete
eradication of valuable precedent.
Federal preemption of the entire product liability field would de-
stroy this area of law rather than reform it, leaving no guidance for
the formulation of the systems to take its place. Consequently, Con-
gress should move away from sweeping preemption and should focus
instead on constructive reform. It must be remembered that all
change is not necessarily progress, and that all movement is not neces-
sarily forward.
this reasoning is applicable only if the manufacturers have complied with all FDA
standards. Id. at 722 n.171.
164. Note, supra note 13, at 700-01.
165. See Note, Market Share Liability For DES (Diethy/stilbestrol) Injuy: A New
H'gh Water Mark in Tort Law, 60 NEB. L. REV. 432, 446-47 (1981) (advocating partial
governmental liability, a ceiling on the amount of damages a plaintiff could recover,
increased funding to agencies responsible for regulating DES manufacturing, ban-
ning sales of products which violate quality and safety standards, and establishing a
system of uniform loss apportionment).
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